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[a]nd they are not, after all, to be lovers in parachutes of sunlit voile, lapsing gently, hand in 
hand, down to anything meadowed or calm. Surprised? 
–Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 1973 
 
[b]ut my god, how? if I’m not a Milton, my genius gleaming and garrulous,  
how do I see what’s wrong … ? 
–William H. Gass, The Tunnel, 1995 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines the representation of the Fall of Man in John Milton’s Paradise Lost 
from a Lacanian angle. Using Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’ and his tripartite schema of the ‘Real’, 
the ‘Imaginary’, and the ‘Symbolic’ orders as a template, I will address the repercussions of 
the Fall and establish to what extent the move from the Real, through the Imaginary, to the 
Symbolic can be seen to be mirrored in the move from a pre-lapsarian state to a post-lapsarian 
reality in Paradise Lost. 
 As a moment of change, the Fall of Man results in a separation of God’s Word from 
the word that will eventually be with Adam and Eve, after the event of the Fall. The pre-
lapsarian Word combines signifier and signified so perfectly that meaning is never 
compromised: signifier and signified are still one, united. In contrast, the word in its post-
lapsarian instance is subject to a prying apart of the signifier from the signified. As a result, 
meaning is ascribed to the more tangible signifier rather than to the hidden signified. This new 
distinction in the post-lapsarian world occludes meaning because it prevents direct rapport 
between the two constituents of meaning formerly united in the pre-lapsarian state.  
The assumption that the event causes a change that is a separation, divisive by nature, 
is central to my reading of Paradise Lost. The separation, in the broadest sense, is felt and 
evidenced on various levels. It creates distance, a horizontal distinction between Adam and 
Eve, for example, as well as a vertical prying apart of God and Man, and of Creation in 
general. Within the scope of this thesis, I will identify these various levels of separation and 
examine to what extent these cracks in the narrative of Eden can be mirrored in the Lacanian 
narrative of the Mirror Stage and in that of the move through the three orders. In other words, 
I will look for evidence of a naturalness of language before the Fall and for signs of its 
corrupted counterpoint in that of after the event. A Lacanian approach will help me frame the 
	 Fousert 4 
 
investigation by placing the Word and the word on opposite sides of the spectrum: Real (for 
now – I will elaborate on this later) and Symbolic, respectively. 
Overall, my aim is to ascribe to the moment of the Fall of Man a Lacanian 
significance. I will argue that the Fall constitutes a moment of flux, the implications of which 
reverberate throughout the post-lapsarian diegesis in the form of separation and concomitant 
distance. It is in the moment of the Fall, through Satan as the embodiment of the signifier, that 
Adam and Eve enter the Lacanian Symbolic order, a plane of being characterized by the 
signifier and its separation from the signified, thus complicating meaning. Traditionally, the 
Symbolic order is characterized by language, which in and of itself is epitomized by a 
separation of signifier from signified, but in the case of Milton’s Adam and Eve the move into 
the Symbolic order represents an additional loss: not only does the pair lose direct and 
intuitive access to meaning as a result of the Fall, they also lose their more immediate, pre-
lapsarian bond with God. Milton’s God, I will submit, exists in an ‘extra-Symbolic’1 space 
where his Word holds signifier and signified in perfect unity, so that language in this order is 
natural beyond description or understanding, from the post-lapsarian perspective. After the 
Fall, Adam and Eve are propelled into a linguistic order in which too much store is set by the 
signifier and its predominance. The pair, consequently, exists at a remove from both the 
signified and from God. As a result of the Fall of Man, the Symbolic order of Satan comes to 
replace the unity that marks the pre-lapsarian plenitude of the extra-Symbolic. 
 Milton’s Paradise Lost is a fixture in the academic world. The text has been at the 
receiving end of considerable academic and critical interest for years, and myriad readings 
																																								 																				
1	A coinage to accommodate Milton’s God in a space that is, paradoxically, Real-like even in the presence of the 
Word, of language. It is impossible to read God in Paradise Lost as Real, since he is never outside of language. 
At the same time, God’s language is never Symbolic, because it is perfect and natural in its transparency in a 
way that the language of the Symbolic order could never be. In an extra-Symbolic capacity, God is both 
accessible and inaccessible, which is a supposition that Milton, in all likelihood, would have condoned or, at 
least, not have categorically rejected. 
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have attempted to rediscover Milton’s epic by way of the fresh perspective that a critical 
approach can afford. Yet, despite this, the study of Milton’s Paradise Lost is by no means a 
field in which no stone is left unturned. One of the reasons behind the present reading, for me, 
is that I believe that Paradise Lost, for all the academic dissecting it has been subjected to 
over the years, is still as alive and researchable as ever, if only we use the appropriate tools.  
I argue that the Lacanian angle on Paradise Lost has not yet been fully exploited in 
academia. Approaching the Fall in Paradise Lost from a Lacanian angle, for example, allows 
me to impose a theoretical framework on the text that elucidates the intricacies of the way in 
which God’s Word functions in Paradise. Paradise Lost provides a glimpse of the pre-
lapsarian Word as Milton envisioned it, and it is by means of a Lacanian template that I will 
be able to expand on this. The presence of the Word complicates an interpretation by way of 
the traditional Lacanian schema, since the Word introduces a language that is Real-like, a 
perfect expression of language, through and in the Word of God. It is language nonetheless 
and hence potentially Symbolic in the traditional Lacanian sense. This leads to the 
introduction of a linguistic order that is, paradoxically enough, such a perfect model of 
language as we know it, it is “unspeakable” (PL V, 156) 2 and unknowable. I will use the term 
‘extra-Symbolic’ as the Miltonic equivalent of the Lacanian ‘Real’. In other words, it works 
both ways: in order to accommodate Milton in Lacan, I will have to adapt Lacanian thought in 
order to respectfully place Milton’s beliefs within this framework. To accommodate both 
kinds of language, the pre- and the post-lapsarian instances of it, a slight modification of 
Lacan’s schema is necessary. 
For an investigation into the Lacanian and linguistic aspects of Milton’s text, I will 
draw on Catherine Belsey’s John Milton: Language, Gender, Power and John Leonard’s 
																																								 																				
2	John Milton, Paradise Lost 5.156: for full citation see Bibliography section. The in-text parenthetical (PL, 
Book# Line#) is used throughout, with (Book#, Line#) following subsequent citations within the same 
paragraph. 
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Milton and the Language of Adam and Eve, respectively. There is some overlap between 
Belsey’s project and mine. In a chapter entitled “Sovereignty”, Belsey provides a Lacanian 
reading of Paradise Lost. Whereas I will place God in an extra-Symbolic realm (comparable 
to the Lacanian order of the Real), Belsey chooses to read God as a Symbolic entity. 
Approaching Milton’s God from this angle complicates the character of God as well as the 
nature of language in Paradise Lost. Placing God in an order that is marked by rigid structures 
and lack undermines the plenitude that Milton ascribes to God and his Word. For example, 
Belsey writes that “[l]ike all subjects, God is subject to desire” (Besley 70). Milton would 
have been uncomfortable with a reading of God as Symbolic. The key is to recognise the 
existence of a distinction between the Word, as a natural, pre-lapsarian language and a post-
lapsarian approximation of this natural language: the Word transcends post-lapsarian 
language. In contrast to this instance of the Symbolic word, the pre-lapsarian Word becomes 
extra-Symbolic, Real-like. In response to Belsey’s reading, and bearing on Milton’s 
understanding of his God and the Word as it is represented in Paradise Lost, my reading 
approaches the text from a different angle. God, if anything, will be regarded as belonging to 
the opposite of the Symbolic order. In my reading, the Symbolic is the order of Satan and 
therefore, by default, not of God. 
John Leonard’s Milton and the Language of Adam and Eve is concerned with, most 
centrally, the language of the Edenic pair. Leonard’s reading pivots on the Fall of Man in 
Paradise Lost. It is specifically sensitive to the distinction between the pre-lapsarian and the 
post-lapsarian state, and the way in which each state is linguistically reflected in Milton’s 
narrative. In his chapter “The Fall of Man”, Leonard zooms in especially on “Satan’s 
corruption of Eve’s language” (192) and the corruption of language in a more general sense, 
after the Fall. Insofar as Leonard distinguishes between the language of before the Fall and 
that of after the event, he employs a different theoretical framework. Leonard recognizes that 
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language, as Satan deploys it, is corruptive: “Satan bestows names and words amiss so as 
deliberately to lead Eve into false interpretations” (199), and “Adam’s Fall also involves a 
corrupting of language” (222). He does not, however, link this development to a Lacanian 
move from a natural, Real-like form of communication to a compromised, signifier-centred 
Symbolic language. In the present reading, informed by Lacanian thought, the language from 
before the Fall is extra-Symbolic, inspired by the Word of God, whereas the language in the 
post-lapsarian world is marked by a clear distinction between signifier and signified, so that 
meaning is less stable and prone to corruption. 
I will commence with a methodology that will elucidate the theoretical framework 
central to the purposes and development of my arguments. The methodology will comprise an 
exposition of, first, Lacan’s predecessors. Sigmund Freud and Ferdinand de Saussure will be 
discussed to help provide an understanding of how certain Lacanian notions have come into 
being as a result of their work and legacies. After these two strains of influence have been 
untangled and discussed, I will turn to Lacan proper. Certain key notions such as the Lacanian 
triad of the ‘Real’, the ‘Imaginary’, and the ‘Symbolic’ will be explained, as well as the 
pivotal theory of the Mirror Stage and the way the structure of language is imposed upon the 
individual in the moment of the Mirror Stage, by way of the non du père. The notion of the 
Father as the prime and original figure of authority functions in a very central way, not only in 
Lacanian thought, but also in Milton’s Paradise Lost. 
In the first chapter, “Satan and the Separation of the Sign”, I will dive into the question 
of separation, with a focus on the linguistic aspect of this distance. I will argue that, since God 
is the Word, the hierarchic scale of Creation emanates outwards and downwards, away from 
God. This scale mirrors the separation between signifier and signified: the closer to God, the 
closer the two constituents of meaning exist in relation to one another. The Word of God 
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constitutes a language so natural that signifier and signified are one. It is in this chapter, then, 
that I will look at the vertical separation mentioned above. God, at the top, combines signifier 
and signified in perfect unity, whereas Satan becomes the embodiment of the unmoored 
signifier, floating and sliding along from meaning to meaning, meaninglessly. This results in 
the post-lapsarian status quo in which the signifier is the locus of (unnatural) non-divine 
power and authority. By initiating the Fall, Satan successfully imposes the Symbolic order on 
Man. 
In chapter two, “Stating the Symbolic: Adam and Eve and the Influence of Satan”, I 
will continue from the notion that Satan is the embodiment of the Symbolic order, and extend 
it to bear more specifically on the relationship of Adam and Eve and the Fall of Man. The 
chapter’s main focus will be on the relationship between Adam and Eve and their relationship 
with the Word and the way in which the event of the Fall reconfigures their bond to result in a 
separation that is more linguistic. The separation in this case is of a horizontal nature. In the 
end, Adam and Eve will have set so much store by the signifier that for them, too, the pre-
lapsarian unity of the Word has become unattainable. At the end of Milton’s epic, Adam and 
Eve will have entered into Satan’s Symbolic order, where show and guile pervade. 
With Satan as ‘all-signifier’, Adam and Eve’s appropriation of his mode of 
communication, through the unstable signifier, causes the pair’s relationship to change. This 
is where and how this chapter builds on the argument presented in the previous chapter. How 
does Satan, as the embodiment of the Symbolic order, influence Adam and Eve? This chapter, 
above all, will be concerned with an investigation into the way the Satanic signifier becomes 
the mode of communication for Adam and Eve, after the Fall. I submit that it is because of the 
pair’s appropriation of the Satanic mode that they are most crucially driven apart and that 
their relationship is reconfigured at the end of Milton’s Paradise Lost. 
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God, in my appropriation of Lacan, will feature as an extra-Symbolic entity, the 
embodiment of a unity of signifier and signified that, through and in his Word, is so complete 
as to accommodate a language that is natural and free as well as active and inherently 
creative. The notion of the Author, in the sense of the creator, will help in clarifying the 
distinction between the different layers in Creation. In their pre-lapsarian state, Adam and Eve 
are closer to God than they will ever be in Paradise Lost. Still, they rely on an interpreter in 
order to communicate with God. The divine speech act, especially, becomes a very effective 
point from which to deconstruct Milton’s Creation in the sense that the disobedience at the 
heart of Milton’s epic is a breach of the prohibition pronounced by the Father through the 
active Word, his Son. Authority, the question of power and whether this lies with a creator, an 
author, is addressed and applied to the vertical make-up of Creation: Satan’s inability to 
accept God’s Authorship and authority causes the vertical hierarchy and separation, and his 
inability to internalize le non du père of God’s Word causes the separation between the 
signifier and the signified to come into being. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 Fousert 10 
 
Methodology 
In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, Jacques Lacan is described in terms that 
are positively lapsarian: “insofar as most psychoanalytic criticism is today Lacanian or post-
Lacanian, there is no way around Jacques Lacan” (Leitch 1157). Lacan constitutes a milestone 
and a pivotal moment in the history of psychoanalysis, since his thought causes a before/after 
distinction to arise. In this sense, Lacan is not unlike the Fall of Man in a biblico-historical 
context: a moment of consequence and of monumental import. In order to fully appreciate 
Lacan, this exposition of his thought will be preceded by a look at the influence of his 
predecessors. 
Psychoanalytically speaking, Jacques Lacan is a product of the Freudian tradition. 
Before Lacan, then, there was Sigmund Freud. Lacan erected and structured his theories on 
the psychoanalytical foundations laid down by Freud himself. Sigmund Freud’s thought 
informed and helped shape many of Lacan’s own ideas. Lacan re-read Freud and transposed 
Freud’s notion of the tripartite psyche into his own understanding of human individuality. 
Lacan’s re-reading of Freud, however, is an inherently linguistic and structuralist undertaking. 
In crude terms, Lacan reads Freud through a Saussurean lens. Informed by a background that 
is more generally linguistic and structuralist by nature than merely psychoanalytical, Lacan 
eventually distinguishes between three different orders of the psyche: the ‘Real’, the 
‘Imaginary’, and the ‘Symbolic’. Each of the three orders has a roughly corresponding 
counterpoint in Freudian thought. In order to arrive at an informed understanding of Lacan’s 
appropriation of his predecessors’ material, I will first turn to Freud and, later, to the influence 
of Saussure. 
In his ‘The Ego and the Id’, specifying the point of departure of his project, Freud 
writes: “the division of the physical into what is conscious and what is unconscious is the 
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fundamental premiss of psycho-analysis” (Freud 13). There is, however, a third term. Freud 
distinguishes between the conscience, the conscious, and the subconscious as the main 
building blocks of the human psyche. He labels these separate parts of the self as, 
respectively, the ‘super-ego’, the ‘ego’, and the ‘id’. In ‘The Ego and the Id’, Freud works 
towards an understanding of the inter-related workings of the three parts and, eventually, 
separates the conscience from the conscious: Freud discovers the “existence of a grade in the 
ego, a differentiation within the ego” that is “less firmly connected with consciousness” (28). 
This grade eventually reaches a point where consciousness, in the individual, comes to be 
more than mere presence of mind, as it braches out to include the internalization and 
imposition of morals and a culturally coloured sense of right and wrong: this internalization 
informs the workings of the conscience on the conscious. Taken together, they constitute 
consciousness. 
As a result, the superego becomes “the inevitable expression of the influence of the 
external world” (Freud 38). At a certain point in the individual’s development, when nature 
(comprising both id and ego at this stage) is inevitably moulded and rewired by nurture 
(superego), the superego will branch out from the ego and position itself over it (supra). The 
superego is the moral higher ground overseeing the ego and its id-like nether parts: “[w]hat 
has belonged to the lowest part of mental life of each of us is changed, through the formation 
of the ideal, into what is highest in the human mind by our scale of values” (36). 
Oversimplified, the ego is the result of the push-and-pull movement that exists between the 
superego and the id. If the superego and the id are the two metaphorical horses of vastly 
different breeds and dispositions, the ego is the driver trying to rein them both in and keep the 
chariot on track. The ego is being driven by both the id and the superego. All three Freudian 
terms are now in place. 
	 Fousert 12 
 
Whereas the dichotomy of ‘id’ and ‘ego’ (with the still undifferentiated ‘super-ego’) 
has its roots in Plato and the Phaedrus, Freud’s three-part model of the psyche, in turn, hails 
back to Plato’s Republic. Plato, in discussing the soul and its composition, identifies the 
‘logical’, the ‘spirited’, and the ‘appetitive’ as its main parts. These, in Platonic terms, 
correspond to the three classes of citizens in Plato’s utopian republic, because “there are in a 
city and in the soul of each individual the same three kinds” (Plato 120). Bertrand Russell 
labels the three civilian groups referred to in the Republic as “the guardians, the fighters, and 
the common people” (Russell 111). In Lacan, the same three-way division re-surfaces again, 
by way of Freud and Saussure, as the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. 
Now, I mention Plato for two reasons. Firstly, Freud seems to hint at the Phaedrus 
with a rough and rudimentary appropriation of the chariot allegory early on in ‘The Ego and 
the Id’, where the simple id/ego distinction and the absence of the superego leaves him yet 
without the need of a chariot: “in its relation to the id [the ego] is like a man on horseback” 
(Freud 25). Secondly, Plato’s analogy in the Republic – the simile between the composition of 
the city’s populus and that of the soul – illustrates what Freud’s triad signifies about the 
human psyche in very clear and descriptive terms. The ‘logical’ guardians correspond to 
Freud’s ‘super-ego’ in that they suppress and stand guard over that which needs controlling, 
namely the drives and desires emanating from the other two psychic parts. The ‘spirited’ 
fighters, then, equate with the Freudian ‘ego’ as constantly battling and mediating the 
inhibitions and desires of both the ‘super-ego’ and the ‘id’. Lastly, the ‘appetitive’ common 
people prefigure as the ‘id’, as the domain of dormant desires that are unstructured, natural, 
innate. 
As Freud suggests, the three parts of the psyche can be placed on a chronological 
scale, on which the id is innate and always-already present, naturally accompanied by the ego 
as the individual’s rudimentary sense of self, only to be followed, finally, by the superego. 
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The superego appears later on in the individual’s development, since it is a formerly external 
mechanism. As a result of various societal factors, this mechanism results in an internalized 
and acquired restraint on the ego and the id. Lacan’s model, too, can be placed on a 
chronological scale: the Real is a perpetual state that, over the course of the individual’s 
development, eventually results in the Symbolic. In its structuredness and the way it places 
the individual in a system of external constraints, the Symbolic is similar to Freud’s superego. 
Lacan’s Imaginary, then, like the ego in Freud before the inception of the superego, is the 
direct result of “the influence of the perceptual system”, rooted as it is in visual perception 
(Freud 28).  
Freud’s triad is the dominant, pre-Lacanian model of the human psyche. With Lacan, 
however, this model is subjected to a dramatic shift. Whereas in Freud the subconscious is 
subjected to and in service of the conscious, in Lacanian thought it is the subconscious that is 
regarded as the mind’s most central part: “I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where 
I am not thinking” (Lacan 430). This statement epitomizes the paradigm shift Lacan is 
working towards in ‘The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious’.  
Lacan’s understanding of the human psyche owes a lot to Freud’s model, but it 
drastically departs from it and is inherently subversive. Even in his placing emphasis on the 
unconscious over the conscious, through his inversion of Descartes’s proposition (cogito ergo 
sum), Lacan reveals what is in reality the main aim and thesis of his project, namely to show 
“with what elusive ambiguity the ring of meaning flees from our grasp along the verbal 
string” (430). It is language, and its elusiveness, that compromises the individual and our 
thinking about individuality as a concept or any concept. 
In ‘The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious’, Lacan rhetorically asks: “but 
haven’t we been feeling for a while now that, in following the paths of the letter to reach the 
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Freudian truth, we are getting hot, its flames spreading all around us?” (Lacan 423). Here, 
Lacan acknowledges the importance of Freud’s understanding of the psyche but extends an 
invitation to take a closer look at the way by which Freud has come to this understanding. 
What Lacan in effect undertakes in ‘The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious’ is an 
interpretation of Freud “á la lettre”, a literal reading of Freud’s thought (424). Lacan adopts 
an ‘original’ (or, ab origine) approach to Freud in which he emphasizes the linguistic qualities 
of his thought, its likeness to and rootedness in language.  
Lacan suggests a move back to the source from which the understanding sprung, with 
an eye not only for the thought, but with an interest in the vehicle for thought too. In doing so, 
Lacan inverts, and subverts, Freud’s thought: Lacan accepts Freud’s notion of the 
unconscious, emphasizes its centrality by ascribing linguistic qualities to its presentation (for 
example through dreams), and, as a result, he adds the disclaimer that everything, even the 
‘autonomous’ individual, is naturally and consequently subjected to language: “the [Signifier] 
and [signified] of the Saussurian algorithm are not in the same plane, and man was deluding 
himself in believing he was situated in their common axis, which is nowhere (Lacan 430-1). 
In order to explain how Lacan was to arrive at such a radical statement, I will have to 
go off at a tangent and briefly touch upon the linguistic legacy of Ferdinand de Saussure and 
the intellectual shock waves he and it caused. This, then, is where Freud meets Saussure. 
Lacan departs from Freud’s traditional thought as a result of the developments made in the 
field of linguistics, especially by Saussure, and the emergence of (French) structuralism, 
which Saussurean thought directly contributed to. Lacan did to psychoanalysis what Claude 
Levi-Strauss did to anthropology in the 1940s: he adapted the Saussurean notion of meaning-
through-difference – “in language there are only differences” (Saussure 862), so that “in a 
language-state everything is based on relations” (863) – to fit a psychoanalytical model. 
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The notes that make up the later ‘Course in General Linguistics’ form the foundation 
of modern linguistics (Leitch 845). Saussure introduced the notion that language is relational, 
which means that “language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each 
term results solely from the simultaneous presence of others” (Saussure 858). For example, 
the signifier ‘chair’, in general use, refers to a piece of furniture designed to seat one person 
and not to a piece of furniture designed to eat at, since this object is already denoted by the 
term ‘table’. 
Saussure also recognizes that “the bond between the signifier and the signified is 
arbitrary” (Saussure 854). This is an assumption that has proven very central, linguistically, 
since it follows that the relationship between the signifier and its signified is haphazard, while 
at the same time defying human control. If arbitrariness is involved in deciding which 
signifier forms a pair with a certain signified, but the individual speaker is not in a position to 
freely invent, then it must mean that, to prevent meaning from slipping away, the arbitrariness 
must be at least somewhat systematic, part and parcel of the underlying structure of language. 
Language, then, implicates its user to the extent that he or she is able to use it 
according to preordained, set rules only. In order to convey meaning with speech, or its audio-
images (symbols), one has to abide by these rules. From a Saussurean perspective, language is 
like a board game: “a rule-bound system of oppositions and differences that governs a closed 
but infinite set of operations” (Leitch 848).  Interestingly, Lacan uses a similar analogy to 
describe the signifying nature of language: “this game is played, in its inexorable subtlety, 
until the match is over, where I am not because I cannot situate myself there” (Lacan 430). 
This goes back to what Lacan means when he speaks of the “common axis” of the signifier 
and the signified and the absence if this axis (431). The speaker finds himself or herself so 
completely implicated in the relationship between signifier and signified that the notion that 
the individual can govern or somehow control it seems valid and defensible, to them. In 
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reality, the speaker is of course utterly entrenched in the structure of language, according to 
Lacan. 
To the individual, there is no being outside of language, there is no transcending 
language. Saussure writes: “without language thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are 
no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language” (Saussure 
856). This clearly anticipates Lacan. In comparison, Lacan writes that “truth emerges with the 
appearance of language”, but because language exists outside of the individual and is always-
already present before the individual learns to navigate its structure, the truth cannot readily 
be grasped (Lacan 436). This is the crux at the heart of the Symbolic order. 
Before I move on to a discussion of the Symbolic proper and the intermediary 
Imaginary stage, I will first unpack two additional, and very central, Lacanian notions, namely 
the ‘other’/‘Other’ dyad and its concomitant Freudian tendencies. Between them, the ‘other’ 
and the ‘Other’ epitomize the Mirror Stage. The Lacanian ‘other’ comes into play the moment 
the individual is faced with their reflection in a reflective surface. From that moment onwards, 
the mirror image of the infant negates the instinctive sense that the self is located inside of the 
individual. The mirror relegates the infant’s sense of self to a sphere outside of its immediate 
being, to its surroundings: the self, by acquiring context, has become ‘other’. The ‘other’ is 
imaginary not only because it is intricately tied to the image in the mirror, and the Imaginary 
stage, but also because it upholds an image to the infant that is, in conjunction with its 
context, suggestive of the alter egos the infant can (potentially) assume. 
The concept of the ‘Other’, more than any other Lacanian postulation, combines the 
influences of both Freud and Saussure. Saussure is the most evident and direct influence in 
that the ‘Other’ is the sphere of language: the ‘Other’ is described by Lacan as “the locus of 
speech” (Lacan 524), the place “where discourse is situated” (568). The way to the ‘Other’, 
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however, is where Lacan’s Freudian foundation is evidenced, since the ‘Other’ is “the beyond 
in which the recognition of desire is tied to the desire for recognition” (436). Before this is the 
case, however, before the ‘Other’ has become a beyond, it is from the complex relation 
between the father on the one hand and the mother and the infant on the other that this desire 
springs. This introduces the Oedipus complex. Tallis writes that, since Lacan is above all a 
Freudian, “the mirror stage has […] to be incorporated into the framework of the orthodox 
Freudian theory of infant sexuality” (Tallis 137). 
Freud’s legacy of the Oedipus complex is the theoretical bridge that connects the 
notions of the ‘other’ and the ‘Other’. As part of the Mirror Stage the infant experiences and 
moves through a Lacanian rendition of the Oedipus complex. In Lacan’s appropriation, the 
infant is not rivalled by the father’s sexual claim on the mother, as in Freud. Rather, the father 
figure threatens to rival the infant and his or her claim on the mother on a linguistic level, as 
the father in the mirror is “engaged in verbal rather than carnal intercourse” (Tallis 138). The 
bond between the parents is such that the mother reserves not only a place for the image of the 
father figure but also a place “for the Name-of-the-Father in the promulgation of the law” 
(Lacan 482). The Father, by (re)presenting “the prohibition of incest” (229), lays down a law 
that comes to symbolize the Symbolic order as a whole, the structure of language. Lacan 
writes that “[i]t is in the name of the father that we must recognise the basis of the symbolic 
function which, since the dawn of time, has identified his person with the figure of the law” 
(230). The resolution of Oedipus complex, the acceptance of the paternal prohibition, le non 
du père, heralds the Symbolic order. As soon as the non du père is accepted, the nom du père 
is reinstated as rightfully the father’s. In other words, this results in an identification with the 
Father, as the ‘Other’. By accepting the place of the father figure, through identification, the 
infant accepts the non du père, the constraints of language. The Oedipus complex is resolved 
and the Symbolic order is entered into. 
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In the Symbolic order, the Real can but be approached through language. This 
approach, however, is ineffectual. After the move into the Symbolic order the individual can 
only relate to the external world as, what Lacan calls, the “Other’s discourse (with a capital 
O)” (Lacan 436). The Symbolic, recasts the formerly external ‘other’, which is natural to the 
Imaginary order, as the ‘Other’: “this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a 
guarantor of the truth in which my lie subsists” (436). With the move into the Symbolic order, 
language comes to place another impediment between what is perceived and perceivably true. 
In the Symbolic order, all that is perceived is communicated to the individual only in terms of 
language. In the Symbolic order, the Real is twice-removed: from the ‘other’ in the Imaginary 
to the ‘Other’ in the Symbolic, since, the ‘Other’ is “the locus of speech” (524). 
The Symbolic cannot ever appropriately measure and approximate the Real through 
the ‘Other’, in which unattainability surfaces a ‘lack’ (objet petit a). Consequently, our ‘lack’ 
is given substance through a predicament that is at the same time of Tantalean and of 
Procrustean proportions. Language, in a Lacanian sense, can be considered Procrustean in the 
sense that it is the embodiment of the Law, prescriptive by nature. The structure of language 
begs conformity. The Tantalean aspect of language surfaces in the notion that the speaker is 
always unwittingly subjected to this linguistic structure: the constant urge of the speaker to 
take the position of the subject, the I, without realizing that the assumption of this position is 
by no means a free choice. Yet, it being the only available choice, there is some consolation in 
the thought that through language, the Symbolic, the Real can be seemingly approximated. 
The subject maintains a steadfast belief in the freedom of language, despite all evidence to the 
contrary. 
With the terms of the ‘other’ and the ‘Other’ in place, I will now be able to turn to the 
Imaginary order and the Mirror Stage. Before the Symbolic order, Lacan distinguishes the 
preceding Imaginary. In the Imaginary phase, the infant is at least still able to relate to the 
	 Fousert 19 
 
external world on a visual and visceral level. The Imaginary, by way of the ‘Mirror Stage’, 
“situates the agency known as the ego […] in a fictional direction that will forever remain 
irreducible” (Lacan 76). This, however, concerns a mere image, a visual representation. Lacan 
writes that “[w]hile Freud – by situating in this ego the synthesis of the perceptual functions 
in which the sensorimotor selections are integrated – seems to agree with the tradition that 
delegates to the ego the task of answering for reality, this reality is simply all the more 
included in the suspension of the ego” (Lacan 433). Here, Lacan seeks to explain how, 
contrary to its representation in Freud’s model, the individual is pried apart from the Real as 
early as the occurrence of the Mirror Stage: the image the infant is faced with in the moment 
of the Mirror Stage does nothing to uphold the notion that the ego is a whole and 
undifferentiated being. Indeed, it calls into being the ‘other’. 
With the Mirror Stage, Lacanian thought recognizes a very pivotal moment in the 
development of the individual. This moment, in effect, creates the individual, or the sense of 
being separate(d). The so-called ‘Mirror Stage’ constitutes an original moment of 
individuation: it marks a beginning and is also the first instance of such a moment, for the 
individual. The mirror provides a look at and into an independent, social, and unique being. 
Before the Mirror Stage, there is no such thing as the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ (big or 
small) as prior to the fact there is no sense of either the former or the latter: there is no 
distinction between what Lacan refers to as the ‘Innenwelt’ and the ‘Umwelt’ (Lacan 78). A 
child, before the occurrence of the Mirror Stage, does not distinguish between within and 
without and, as a result, resides in a state of blissful being. This state is ruptured by the 
individual’s inevitable passage through the Mirror Stage. The Imaginary state is entered into 
in the face of the individual’s mirrored, and direly distorted, image. 
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The reflected or mirror image that signals the Mirror Stage is a distorted representation 
and amounts to a misrecognition. Virtually analogous to the distinction between the German 
terms (or Lacan’s evocation of them through the ‘self’ and ‘other’ dichotomy) for that which 
belongs to the inner sphere and that which resides outside the realm of the individual is 
Lacan’s pairing of the mind and the body and the way he recognises how the two are affected 
by the Mirror Stage. Herein lies Lacan’s explanation for the shattering effect that the Mirror 
Stage has on the infant recently visually weaned off the Real. The Mirror Stage results in a 
suspension of the individual’s instinctive belief that the mind and the body overlap completely 
and utterly and are therefore indistinct, whole. As a result of the individual’s first glance in 
the mirror, the body is cortically identified with and recognised as separate from the mind. 
The body, from that first glance onward, is no longer analogous to the mind: the image of the 
‘Innenwelt’ and the ‘Umwelt’ being one – an image construed from the “intra-organic mirror” 
(Lacan 78) – is shattered and replaced, or, rather, superseded by the image in the mirror. The 
image in the mirror is extra-organic, in the sense that it resides outside of the individual.  
What sets Man apart from other primates, Lacan notes, is that, despite the ontological 
paradigm shift affected by the Mirror Stage, the individual recognises the “uselessness of the 
image” (Lacan 93). The image in the mirror is recognised as not being the ultimate and stable 
‘signifier’ of the inner being of the infant. Most importantly, as a result of the Mirror Stage, 
the individual recognises the remove that exists between the ‘signifier’ and the ‘signified’, on 
a visual level. It is in this sense that the image is considered useless by the infant. 
The Mirror Stage, apart from revolving around a moment of misrecognition, amounts 
to “the intersection of nature and culture” (Lacan 80). This, too, has to do with Lacan’s 
appropriation of Saussurean thought. When Lacan reflects upon the image of the infant “held 
tightly by some prop, human or artificial” as it tries to face its reflection, he means that the 
infant’s response to the image is shaped by the external world and is, on various levels, 
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supported by it (Lacan 76). The Mirror Stage, rather than immediately casting the I (the 
individual) as a subject in the Symbolic order, first causes the infant to misrecognise its place 
in the mirror image as occupying an object position. During the Mirror Stage and the 
Imaginary, the infant is an object, but it is only objectified in the sense that it is part of a 
larger structure, the external Symbolic that the outside world of the parents and/or caregivers 
impose on the infant.  
The Mirror Stage, in effect, “establish[es] a relationship between an organism and its 
reality” (Lacan 78). However, in the case of the infant, as opposed to the primate, the fact of 
the Mirror Stage “decisively projects the individual’s formation into history” (78). As part of 
the constitutive process of the Mirror Stage, the infant is forced into an alienating identity, 
which is the result of the original image held before the infant, as an imago: “the infans stage 
thus seems to me to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is 
precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of identification 
with the other” (76). On an internal and mental level, then, one can distinguish between the 
Imaginary and the Symbolic, but in reality the image the infant is faced with is replete with 
Symbolic significance from the very beginning: the image already exists in a Symbolic 
structure. As Lacan writes, the image “symbolizes the I’s mental permanence, at the same 
time as it prefigures its alienating destination” (76). This destination is found in the Symbolic. 
The Mirror Stage, then, is a watershed, a crossroads, and it heralds all the constraints 
adult life has in store for the budding individual, but in and of itself, this development is not a 
lingering state: it is the juncture where the Real and the Symbolic collide, or, more precisely, 
divide. The blissful state all of the child’s being is steeped in before the Mirror Stage, the 
Real, is superseded by the sense of being objectified, in the mirror image. The Imaginary, 
then, is the post-specular (after-the-image) state in which the infant is an object and 
unhindered access to the Real is no longer possible, except through the ‘other’ in which is the 
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Real is located. In the Symbolic, the individual is no longer an object in the specular (mirror-
related) sense, but has become a firm subject in the Symbolic order, and this position masks 
the objectification of the I and in turn casts the individual as an alienated subject. The Real, 
from the vantage point of the Symbolic order, is only approachable as the ‘Other’. In the 
Symbolic order, the I is (mis)recognised as the subject. 
This later linguistic act of (mis)recognition takes the individual from the Imaginary 
into the Symbolic order. The repercussions of this move reverberate throughout the 
individual’s life. After becoming aware of having a body, as part of the Mirror Stage, the 
individual becomes aware of this body being a ‘somebody’. This marks the individual’s 
propulsion into the socio-linguistically structured ‘reality’ of everyday life: the Imaginary is 
left behind and superseded by the Symbolic order, which is inherently alienating. The 
individual’s passage into this post-specular state (which is no longer merely visual-sensory) is 
characterised by a subsequent sense of ‘lack’ on the part of the individual, because the 
Imaginary is now only ever just within reach through the Symbolic. The Symbolic, however, 
cannot ever appropriately measure and approximate the Real.  
The linguistic developments furthered by Saussure, allowed Lacan to combine the 
linguistic with the psychoanalytical. Saussure helped Lacan to formulate the notion that the 
unconscious is structured like language. As a result, in Lacan, the subconscious takes 
precedence over the conscious. Lacan notes that “the sliding of the signifier under the 
signified, which is always happening (unconsciously, let us note) in discourse” is not unlike 
the unconscious processes of the psyche as it pertains to its conscious manifestations (Lacan 
425). The unconscious can be read like language.  
Using Saussure, Lacan upends Freud, relegating the self to a sphere outside of the self, 
removing it from its place at the ontological centre: in ‘The Insistence of the Letter in the 
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Unconscious’, “Lacan seeks to alter nothing less than our deepest notions of what we are” 
(Barry 108). Lacan argues that, as a result of the individual’s linguistic development, the 
acquisition of language and its structure, the individual is bound by the systemic nature of 
language. Language brings about “the self’s radical eccentricity with respect to itself that man 
is faced with” (Lacan 435). It is through language that the self is dislodged from its former 
centre, only to commence the inevitable orbital movement around the centre where now, 
unassailable, the Other resides. Before the Other came into being, Signifier (S) and signified 
(s) were not yet separated: again, that “common axis, which is nowhere” (Lacan 430-1). 
Working with the thought of both Freud and Saussure, Lacan connects “the 
functioning of language and the functioning of desire” (Leitch 1161). Lacan’s re-imagination 
of the tripartite psyche, especially, reflects the influence of both the Freudian and the 
Saussurean on his ideas. Like the ‘id’ in Freud, the Real is a realm at a remove from the 
individual: it is always, and has always been, present, but it cannot be reached. The order of 
the ‘Real’ is an innate state, but in Lacan, it is superseded by the Imaginary the moment the 
infant perceives its own image in a mirror. The Imaginary is in turn replaced by the Symbolic 
on the child’s acquisition of language, his or her first linguistic steps. The Symbolic is a state 
dominated and codified by language and referents, through the symbols of which only can the 
Real be approximated: “[i]t is from speech that [it] receives its instrument, its frame, its 
material, and even the background noise of its uncertainties” (Lacan 413). 
Lacan, by synthesizing Saussurean and Freudian thought, provides a whole new angle 
on both language and the human mind. Similarly, Milton’s Paradise Lost is deeply concerned 
with language and the development of character. Milton’s God, for example, as the 
embodiment of the Word, holds signifier and signified in unity. Satan, on the other hand, is 
the Symbolic obverse to the Word of God – the word, signifier only. The moment this 
distinction has been made, it becomes possible to dive into questions of authorship and 
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authority, with regards to God, but also with regards to Satan or Adam, which is where the 
Freudian influences of the Lacanian template come into play: the Oedipus complex and the 
role of the father figure in the imposition of the structure of language lay bare the power 
relations between the characters. A theoretical framework informed by Lacanian thought 
promises to be very effective as a means of re-reading the epic. The following chapters will 
attempt to do justice both to the theoretical framework sketched and constructed above and to 
the text that will, hopefully, open up in new and interesting ways by being approached 
through this underexploited Lacanian lens. 
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Chapter 1 
Satan and the Separation of the Sign 
 
“that be from thee farr / That farr be from thee” 
– Paradise Lost, III 153-4 
 
I will start with a disclaimer concerning the insurmountable paradox of trying to ascribe truly 
Lacanian ‘Real’-like qualities to a narrative that is, after all, created and set down in the black 
and white of words. Narratively speaking, the character of God, who is, for all intents and 
purposes, the paragon of the ‘Real’, is as linguistically rooted in Milton’s narrative as is the 
character of Satan, for example. Having said this, language works in different ways for the 
various characters in Paradise Lost. Or, rather, language is used in different ways by different 
characters. As much as God, too, speaks, there is a definite sense that his speech, or his use of 
language, has qualities and characteristics that allow for it to be marked as ‘Real’, as opposed 
to ‘Symbolic’, even though it is set down in words all the same. Danielson remarks that 
“Milton never presents his God as if he is not really God, the eternal and almighty Being who 
created the heavens and the earth” (Danielson 144). In other words, Milton’s fictional God is 
more than a fiction of God. 
From a Judaeo-Christian perspective, there is no room between signifier and signified 
for God. Turning to the source of the Word, the Bible, or, more specifically, to the Gospel of 
John, the bond between God and the Logos is described in terms of the strictest unity: “[i]n 
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (KJV, 
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John 1.1). In Paradise Lost, too, there is a sense that the biblico-theological oneness of God 
and his Word is a reality. As Belsey writes: “the epic in its turn derives its authority from the 
divinely authorized Scriptures, the written exposition of God’s ways” (Belsey 68). Milton’s 
Paradise Lost draws on the Bible in the sense that it both represents the ‘original’ text and is 
an extension of it: Milton continues what the Bible apparently falls short of doing and 
therefore requires, namely to “justifie the wayes of God to men” (PL I, 26). In this role 
Milton’s text serves to add another layer of meaning to the Word, another take on and 
interpretation of it. Milton’s epic, as a text, is a signifier of the signified behind it, the Bible, 
and it is on the factual overlap between the two that the biblico-historical verisimilitude of 
Milton’s text is founded and whence it derives its paradoxical nature. Consequently, in 
Milton’s epic, God both is and is more than the Word. 
From a Lacanian perspective, the quote from the first book in the Gospel of John, 
disregarding its theological overtones, can be said to capture the essence of the Symbolic 
order if the term ‘God’ is replaced by the term ‘Other’, that which resides in the Symbolic 
order: in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the Other, and the Word was 
the Other. God is a being that, from the earthly perspective of Adam and Eve, since they only 
ever encounter the Word, cannot be fathomed because it concerns an ‘otherness’ that is only 
referred to through and in the structure of language. As Lacan elucidates: the Other is “a place 
that is essential to the structure of the symbolic” (Lacan 379), since “in language our message 
comes to us through the Other” (Lacan 9). Just as it is impossible for the individual, as a 
subject, to reach beyond to the Lacanian ‘Other’, God too is unattainable: the creation in 
Paradise Lost is always subjugated to God, being ex deo by nature, as opposed to ex nihilo, 
meaning that all of God’s works, his Creation entire, are taken from within Him and are 
substantially part of the deity (Flannagan 542n61). Similar to the way language is an already-
existing structure that the individual is entered into in the Lacanian Symbolic order, the 
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Creation in Paradise functions as an inherently natural hierarchy in which the individual is 
subjected to God in a fixed place. As a result, the individual cannot ever commune with the 
deity without intercession of something resembling the Lacanian ‘other’, a being like the 
individual through whom, by way of relationality, the ‘Other’, God, can be approximated. 
This chapter will be preoccupied with an investigation into the separation between 
signifier and signified and the way this separation is mirrored in the celestial hierarchy. There 
is a definite correspondence between the closeness of signifier and signified and a subject’s 
place in the celestial hierarchy in Paradise Lost. It is the hierarchical structure and make-up of 
Creation that illustrates most clearly the separation between God and the Word: the farther 
from God on the ladder of creation, the bigger the remove between signifier and signified. 
God, all the way at one end of the spectrum, at the head of Creation, unites the two 
constituents of meaning so that there simply is no remove, no separation. God’s is a natural 
language, a continuum, free from obfuscation and fog: God is the “Author of all being, / 
Fountain of Light” (PL III, 374-5). His words provide clarity and illumine. With Satan, 
however, signifier and signified have drifted irrevocably apart: he is rightly called “the Prince 
of Darkness” (X, 383). Satan’s language, in contrast to God’s, is marked by wordplay and 
dressed in double entendre. In other words, Satan is ‘all-signifier’, wholly and utterly fixated 
on the “outward lustre” (I, 97) and the guile of the signifier. In Milton’s Creation in Paradise 
Lost, there exists a vertical separation between signifier and signified: God is found at the 
indivisible head and Satan at the other extreme, occasioning a rift and a rent in the universe of 
the Word. Herein lies the central premise of this chapter. God is the capital-W Word, whereas 
Satan is the embodiment of the ever-shifting word. Especially after the Fall, we will see that 
non-divine ‘power’ is the dominant authoritative mode. In the post-lapsarian world, all power 
has been rid of its inverted commas and become “meerly titular” (V, 774) and, thus, it has 
become bound to and in the signifier. 
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The central word or notion is ‘separation’. God, as the center of creation, is with the 
Word, with nothing to separate or pry apart signifier from signified. As a result, his Word can 
be thought of in terms of the Lacanian Real (initially, at least). In Paradise Lost, there is no 
remove between God and his Word, since God is the “Author of all being” (PL III, 374). God 
inscribes meaning into everything in his creation; he is “absolute plenitude” (Belsey 68). God 
quite literally fills everything up, as Milton describes God as the embodiment of infinity: “I 
am who fill / Infinitude” (PL XII, 168-9). 
An allowance has to be made, however. Logically, on the Lacanian scale, God would 
be located in the realm of the Real. This would appear to be the case, especially by dint of his 
inaccessibility: “thy self invisible / Amidst the glorious brightness where thou sit’st / Thron’d 
inaccessible” (PL III, 375-7). In practice, and here, again, the paradox mounts, God’s place in 
Lacan’s schema would be more aptly characterized as extra-Symbolic, or extra-linguistic. 
After all, God is language, especially in his role as the “Author and end of all things” (VII, 
591; emphasis added). God encompasses all of language to such an extent that he is 
simultaneously in and beyond its structure: he creates everything, but he does so through 
language. Of special interest, here, is the divine speech act. Especially God’s creative act in 
Book VII and Adam’s naming of Creation in Book VIII are centrally concerned with the 
active impact of the Word. I will discuss the implications of both later on, below.  
Now, the idea of God as extra-Symbolic rather than Real needs some explicating. God, 
in an extra-Symbolic sense, is the Word only insofar as his language is perfect and free of all 
the structural constraints and subjectification that mark the language that constitutes the 
Lacanian Symbolic order. The extra-Symbolic space differs from both the Symbolic and the 
Real orders in the sense that it retains properties natural to both whilst being neither: it is as 
steeped in language as the Symbolic and as unstructured as the Real. For the present purposes, 
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locating God in the Lacanian realm of the Real would leave unaddressed various implications 
of the Word. Milton’s God, like his scriptural counterpart, is with the Word. With God, 
language is still natural and free of any obscurity: it is still unified. All these nuances will be 
lost and go unappreciated unless God be considered extra-Symbolic.  
Additionally, only when extra-Symbolic properties are ascribed to Milton’s God can 
Satan be considered truly Symbolic, forbidding, the embodiment of the rift between signifier 
and signified. God is beyond language, marrying signifier and signified to form a perfect 
continuum, whereas Satan is fixed within language. Wholly within language, Satan’s 
character hinges on the signifier-signified division. Completely outside of the realm of 
language, in the Real, God would not have any part in the Word. As the paragon of the Real, 
God would be too divorced and too far removed from his Creation, especially in the pre-
lapsarian scenario, where especially Adam seems to share in the creative capacity of 
language. In the Real, God would not be an Author. The paradox here is that a God who is 
equated with the Word is deconstructed, to a certain extent, by a Satan who is the embodiment 
of the Symbolic order, an order that is the very essence of the Word, from a Lacanian 
perspective. 
 Now, to return to Milton’s usage of the word ‘Author’ in Paradise Lost, it is 
significant that, as an epithet, the word slides from one character to the next. Throughout the 
epic, the word occurs a total of 14 times3, but it is not exclusively used in connection to God. 
Adam is referred to as “My Author and Disposer” (PL IV, 635) by Eve. The pair of them, 
Adam and Eve taken together, are “Authors to themselves in all” (III, 122). Satan is, 
variously, the “Author of all ill” (II, 381) and the “Author of evil” (VI, 262), as well as the 
																																								 																				
3 On one occasion it is more clearly, and significantly enough, short for authority: “author unsuspect” (PL IX, 
771). Here, Satan is the ‘unsuspicious authority’, because Eve is misled by his guise and guile. The other 13 
instances of the word reflect a meaning along the lines of ‘creator’, although the shadow sense of ‘authority’ is a 
lingering presence throughout. After all, one third of the word ‘authority’ spells ‘author’. 
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father and “Author” (II, 864) of Sin. The fact that the epithet is used to denote different 
characters implies that language and control over it, by an ‘author’, can potentially be creative 
in the sense that words can physically form and create. It can also, and Milton was fully aware 
of the word’s different shades of meaning, refer to the authoritative nature or consequence of 
the ‘author’, the one who creates. In Paradise Lost, Milton has these complementary senses of 
the word coexist, namely the author as the creator (OED, “author, n.”, II.4) and the author as 
an authority (OED, “author, n.”, II.5). God is an ‘author’ in the most transparent sense of the 
word, and whenever his authorship results in authority it is most natural and justified. With 
Satan, however, his authority as an ‘author’ is deceitful and suspect, for example when he 
“New part puts on” (PL IX, 667) to deceive Eve to take his serpentine word for it and taste of 
the Apple. 
The deployment of the word ‘author’ in the sense of ‘authority’ has certain theoretical 
implications. In Lacanian thought, an individual’s move into the Symbolic order is the direct 
result of their successfully resolving the inevitable Oedipal complex at the heart of the Mirror 
Stage. The moment the father figure enters the picture, in the mirror, he instigates the onset of 
the Oedipal complex, because the Father occupies the place of individual desires. By 
acknowledging the “name of the father” (Lacan 230), the individual enters into the Symbolic 
order, the structure of language. As a result of the identification of the Father with the Law 
and, thus, authority, the initial nom du père is changed into a prescriptive non du père. In 
other words, the word ‘author’, in Milton’s deployment of the word and in the context of 
Paradise Lost, comes to combine le nom du père and le non du père, in one word. It comes to 
embody the essence of the Symbolic order. The word ‘author’, by evoking le non du père, that 
which can be disobeyed, the “sole command” (PL VII, 47), for example, also occasions the 
central act of insubordination and rebellion: “Mans first Disobedience” (I, 1). 
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The creative role of the ‘Author’ is emphasized most clearly in Milton’s exposition of 
the divine speech act. As in Genesis, Milton’s God is considered an ‘author’ in the sense that 
he is the “Author and end of all things” (PL VII, 591) through and in his Word. In Book VII, 
as Raphael relates to Adam “how and wherefore this world was first created” (VII, The 
Argument), the role of God as the literal “Author of this Universe” (XIII, 360) is emphasized. 
This is part of the speech act of the ‘all-making’ word: “Said th’ Omnific Word” (VII, 217) 
and it was. In other words, as the Word is spoken, it consequently calls into being whatever it 
is that is spoken. In retelling the story of creation, Milton follows the biblical original almost 
verbatim, and the recurring instances of “said God” (VII; 243, 261) and “God said” (VII; 282, 
387, 450) preceded or followed by imagery of a universe mid-construction underscore the 
sense of Creation literally being ‘called into being’.  
The role of the Son, too, is very instructive in this respect. In Book VII, the 
relationship of God and the Son is described: “And thou my Word, begotten Son, by thee, / 
This I perform, speak thou, and be it don” (PL VII, 163-4). Ten lines later, the point is 
emphatically repeated by the narrator, Raphael: “So spake th’Almightie, and to what he spake 
/ His Word, the filial Godhead, gave effect” (VII, 174-5). These lines serve to proclaim the 
effective and active nature of God’s Word, in the shape of the Son. The Son is God’s Word, 
and it is through the Son, as the Word, that God creates and performs his godly acts. The Son 
is an executioner, by way of the Word, and, in him, language is as active and creative as it is 
for his father. 
The exaltation of the Son, and his appointment at the right-hand side of God himself 
(PL V, 606), is part of Raphael’s meta-epic in Book V of Paradise Lost. Here, Raphael 
explains and adapts for Adam’s human understanding “th’ invisible exploits / Of warring 
Spirits” (V, 565-6), a concise celestial history, in which the conception of Christ and the 
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action of his appointment elicits from Satan the reaction around which the entire epic 
revolves. The Son’s exaltation, Satan reasons, threatens his and his followers’ position in 
Heaven. Satan is worried that the imposition of Christ will result in a shift of the already 
existing celestial titles: “If these magnific Titles yet remain / Not meerly titular” (V, 773-4), 
and thus meaningless, redundant. 
Where God’s language is constructive, Satan’s is deconstructive. Satan deconstructs 
and rewrites the “sole command” (PL VII, 47) for Eve by oneirically arguing in Book V that 
tasting the Fruit will render “The Author not impair’d, but honourd more” (V, 73). Ironically, 
Satan, after having successfully interfered with God’s Word in Paradise and having ruined the 
Edenic future for Adam and Eve, is referred to by his incestuous offspring, Sin and Death, as 
“Author and prime Architect” (X, 356). As the “Author” of Sin and Death, Satan provides 
Adam and Eve on a less allegorical level with, first, the opportunity to sin, by tempting Eve to 
transgress, and then, as a result of Adam’s “compleating of the mortal Sin” (IX, 1003), the 
pair are introduced to death, or mortality. 
Satan’s prime and most thorough act of destruction, however, lies in his separating 
signifier from signified. Satan maintains that the appointment of the Son will threaten and 
change the hierarchy of Heaven. Satan does not realize that God’s hierarchy is inherently 
meritocratic and that the titles that constitute this hierarchy are fixed and determined based on 
merit and divine right. Of course, God’s ‘divine right’ should not be taken to be limiting or 
exclusive, because there is no such thing as ‘right’, divine or otherwise, before the Fall: God 
just is the head of Creation, by default, but not in any way that suggests a subjection or 
subordination on the part of all beings. Consequently, authority by right is a hard notion for 
Satan to unpack. For Satan and his pride, it is more than enough to have one omnipotence to 
kneel to in eager supplication: “Too much to one, but double how endur’d, / To one and to his 
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image now proclaim’d” (PL V, 783-4). Satan, in his envy, rebels against “the Threatner” (IX, 
687) and “the great Forbidder” (IX, 815) – the latter are Eve’s words but instilled in her by the 
Serpent, whose words “replete with guile / Into her heart too easie entrance won” (IX, 733-4). 
In his guileful way, Satan shuffles the signifiers and makes them slide so that God becomes a 
completely different figure of authority, one that rules on the basis of power and fear. 
The guile and malignant rhetoric of Satan’s speech are characteristic of his mode of 
communication. Satan is all-signifier. When, in Book V, he addresses his subjects, he is guilty 
of the very offence he accuses God of: “Who can in reason then or right assume / Monarchie 
over such as live by right / His equals” (PL V, 794-6). Satan imposes on his subjects, rightly 
his equals, the very same inhibitions he himself rebels against in God. Satan exalts himself 
over his ‘peers’ and expects them to ascribe to his views or to dissent and oppose him, like, 
for example, Abdiel, who “Among innumerable false, unmov’d, / Unshak’n, unseduc’d, 
unterrifi’d / His Loyaltie he kept” (V, 898-9). Abdiel is the only one in Satan’s crowd to see 
through his hypocrisy: “In place thy self so high above thy Peeres” (V, 812), Satan has no 
legitimate grounds for condemning God and his meritocracy. Whereas Abdiel is “unmov’d”, 
fixed in his convictions, Satan most certainly is not. His speech, in its hypocrisy, mirrors the 
sliding movement of a signifier: meaning is first located here, then there. 
Of course, Satan is not only the master of guile and rhetoric when it comes to 
deceiving others; first, the sharp-sighted angel Uriel, to whom Satan’s true nature initially 
went “unperceiv’d” (PL III, 681), is duly misled by Satan, and then Eve, who is thrown by 
Satan’s serpentine act and costume and swayed by his logic moments before the Fall (IX, 
736-8). However, Satan manages above all to deceive and delude himself. He comes to 
believe his in own logic: “The mind is its own place, and in it self / Can make a Heav’n of 
Hell, a Hell of Heav’n” (I, 254-5). In Book IV he has his own logic redound back on him, 
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virtually drowning him in sorrow as he revises his bold earlier statement into a lamenting 
soliloquy: “Me miserable! which way shall I flie / Infinite wrauth, and infinite despaire? / 
Which way I flie is Hell; my self am Hell” (IV, 73-5; emphasis added).  
Satan’s mind is revolving and redounding back on itself, as do his cannons in the 
Battle of Heaven – they backfire, as Flannagan notes “like the cannonry the fallen angels 
invent” (Flannagan 442n12). The opening lines to Book II are very instructive on this point, 
since high and royal 
Satan exalted sat, by merit rais’d, 
To that bad eminence; and from despair 
Thus high uplifted beyond hope, aspires 
Beyond thus high, insatiate to pursue 
Vain Warr with Heav’n … (PL II, 5-9) 
It almost goes without saying that Satan, here, is far from exalted: at this point in the 
narrative, he is as far removed from Heaven, his goal and end, as he will ever be. The epic 
narrator insinuates, mockingly, that Satan is deceiving himself with sentiments “beyond 
hope”, to hubris, and that to take up arms against heaven would be “Vain” and an altogether 
hopeless undertaking. Satan’s high hopes and hubris eventually cause “a worse relapse / And 
heavier fall” (IV, 100-1), as he himself foreshadowed in a dark mood early on in Paradise 
Lost, in Book IV. 
In the opening to Book VII, the epic narrator draws attention to the fact that, here, in 
the third invocation, “The meaning not the Name I call” (PL VII, 5). The narrator, Milton, 
emphasizes that it is not the name of a heathen muse that is important but the meaning that 
resides behind the sign. Conversely, but in a similar way, Satan refers to the recurring, 
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unspecified “Fruit” (I, 1) as, first, “those fair Apples” (IX, 585) and, later, “an Apple” (X, 
487). Flannagan notes that Satan, by coupling the generic image, or Idea, of the “Fruit” to a 
more specific fruit, an “Apple”, reduces the general symbol of the former to the specific 
material object of the latter and consequently trivializes it and what it stands for, namely 
obedience and temperance (Flannagan 638n180). Satan is so far removed from the Word of 
God that, in fact, the signifier has become more important to him than the signified. Language 
has come down for Satan with a bridgeable gap between signifier and signified, to a place 
where the two are no longer unified in meaning: Satan violates the inherent extra-Symbolic 
quality of God’s language, where signifier and signified are indistinguishable, by prying the 
two apart. After the Fall, the signified can be said to remain with God, as the overarching 
meaning, but Satan takes possession of the signifier, and introduces it to Earth and its 
susceptible inhabitants4. Interestingly, it is because of Satan that Hell has come into being and 
significance, from an earthly and human perspective: his offspring, Sin and Death, build a 
bridge in Satan’s wake, traversing the abyss of Chaos to connect Hell up to Earth (PL II, 
1026). After the Fall, Adam and Eve will share in this signification, as the taste of the 
forbidden fruit brings sin and death into their lives. The event of the Fall results in the 
signification of sin and death, the event’s immediate consequence, and fixes them finally to a 
definite signifier: “Sin herself confesses, she and Death were ‘Unnam’d’ and ‘undreaded’ 
until after the Fall” (Leonard 201). It is Satan’s chief contribution to the destruction of the 
Word. Satan brings two concepts into the world that, not unlike the prime signifier himself, 
share his status as ‘all-signifier’. Sin and death do not go back to before the Fall: “the Fruit / 
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste, / Brought Death into the World, and all our Woe” 
(I, 1-3).  
																																								 																				
4	It must be noted that this is all from the perspective of the fallen being: God remains ever inviolate and extra-
Symbolic, secure in a marriage of signifier and signified throughout.	
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In fact, Satan causes a signification through opposition and distance. Satan and the 
fallen angels are “far remov’d from God and light of Heav’n” (PL I, 73). Consequently, 
“since God is light” (III, 3), Satan’s being, in comparison, brings about the binary nature of 
creation. Through Satan as lowest and darkest, God becomes, through the Son, the most 
effulgent (VI, 680). Satan, in his own mind, extends this signification so far that he ends up 
with what is, in reality, merely a perverted and distorted take on the original: “Evil be thou my 
Good” (IV 110). In Satan’s mind, neither term has any real meaning anymore, which is part of 
the reason why he is so conflicted and “much revolving” (IV, 31). 
In an essay simply titled ‘God’, Curran remarks that the reader “respond[s] so 
powerfully to Satan because, unlike God, he talks like us” (Curran 527). God’s ‘right’ speech 
in Paradise Lost is on a different plane from the reader’s speech, and as fallen beings it is 
hard for the reader not to feel uncomfortable. On the other hand, what can the reader expect 
from Satan but a language that is misleading and has a hidden agenda. Fish remarks that the 
reader “simultaneously admit[s] the effectiveness of Satan’s rhetoric and discount[s] it 
because it is Satan’s” (Fish 12). For the reader, then, the difference between God’s speech on 
the one hand and Satan’s on the other is that the former goes beyond expectation, whereas the 
latter provides just what is expected. 
As I have argued above, God is positioned in an extra-Symbolic order in the universe 
of Paradise Lost. Belsey has a completely different view on God and his position in the 
Lacanian orders. According to Belsey, God enters into the Symbolic order, in the moment of 
the exaltation of the Son. She writes that “it is precisely in terms of the Word that God enters 
the symbolic order” (Belsey 68). This, of course, is irrefutable as it pertains to Milton’s 
narrative, in which God, too, is a character with lines. God only enters the Symbolic order 
from man’s perspective, be it the reader’s or the perspective of the only (immediate) human 
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presence in the epic, Adam and Eve. This happens through the Son, who comes to signify the 
Father in Paradise Lost. It is in this sense that Belsey sees God enter into the Symbolic, as the 
Son who embodies the Word. God himself, however, is hidden behind the Son, behind his 
own image and “Divine Similitude” (PL III, 384). 
God himself, as far as the narrative allows, is not always fully signified. Outside of the 
realm of heaven, God is only encountered as a voice, a source of dazzling light (PL V, 598-9), 
or in the shape of his Son. As the Son, God is the Word, but God himself remains beyond all 
signification. In his narrative, Milton leaves almost no distance between God and his Son: 
“My word, my wisdom, and effectual might, / All hast thou spok’n as my thoughts are” (III, 
171-2), because Christ is one with the Word of his Father. He is “pronounce[d]” (note, here, 
the reference to the act of speaking in Milton’s word choice) exalted “above all names in 
Heaven and earth” (PL III, The Argument). This ties in, again, with the notion of the divine 
speech act. God spoke his ‘omnific’ Word, and it was. 
In Paradise Lost, to bridge the gaps in the natural hierarchy of Creation, the Son 
functions as the prime mediator: again, “My word, my wisdom, and effectual might” (PL III, 
170). God declares and summarizes the Son’s range of licence as follows: “And thou my 
Word, begotten Son, by thee, / This I perform, speak thou, and be it don” (VII, 163-4). The 
Son effectuates God’s will, by way of the Word. The role of the Son, however, is also one of 
support on account of man. God, in Book III, declares that man is “Upheld by me” (III, 178) 
and, later on, fulfilling and effectuating the promise, it is the Son who asks to “Account mee 
man” (III, 238). The Son intercedes on behalf of Man and becomes a Lacanian Imaginary 
prop, a trotte-bébé: “by the hand he took me rais’d” (VIII, 300). As part of the Mirror Stage, 
Lacan describes an infant as needing and leaning on a source of contextual support, something 
to steady the infant the moment they have and experience their first look in a reflective 
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surface. This not only results in the infant’s identification with its own mirror image, but it 
also places the infant’s image in relation to whatever else happens to be in the picture. The 
Son can be considered the first imaginary context, or prop, to support Adam as he is entered 
into the Symbolic order of Eden. Adam, recently conscious, is down on his knees in front of 
his ‘other’: “at his feet I fell / Submiss: he rear’d me” (VIII 315-6).  
The Son’s role as a Lacanian prop functions on various levels. In the first place, he 
literally helps Adam into an upright position (OED, “rear, v.”, I.7.a), but in another sense, as 
the effectuating Word, he also constructs him (OED, “rear, v.”, II.9.a). Lastly, it implies that 
Adam was set in an upright position, namely righteous and good. Adam is reared, too, in the 
sense that the Son raises Adam and provides him with an upbringing (OED, “rear, v.”, 
II.12.b). Here, the sense of the author as a source of authority and the measure of morality and 
rigidity against which the subject is set is invoked. Adam is raised by the Son and taught to 
adhere to certain moral standards. Again, Milton plays on the divine speech act as Adam is 
reared in speech: constructed and brought upright in the right way, through the Word. 
Belsey, in her reading of Paradise Lost, and especially with regards to the exaltation 
of the Son in Book III, extends her Lacanian interpretation of the Son as the signifier to 
include an aspect of desire on God’s part: “[l]ove reaffirms the unity of the differentiated 
Father and Son, reunites the Creator and his Creation” (Belsey 70). God needs the Other, 
namely his earthly creation (the ‘Other’, from God’s perspective, qua the interjection – from 
the Word, through the Sentence, to the Passion – of the Son, his image and ‘other’), and 
descends in the shape of the Son. At first sight, the notion seems sound, but God, in his 
conversation with Adam about companionship and loneliness, voices these sentiments: 
What thinkst thou then of mee, and this my State,  
Seem I to thee sufficiently possest   
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Of happiness, or not? who am alone 
From all Eternitie, for none I know 
Second to me or like, equal much less. (PL XIII, 403-7) 
The passage, in one fell swoop, aligns the reader with Adam, as his seed, and shows the 
ignorance of both in believing that God would share these feelings, such petty and perfectly 
human sentiments. Adam’s want of a helpmeet, of course, is not and cannot be mirrored in 
God, who is in no need of an equal. God, being omnipotent and omnipresent cannot be said to 
experience loneliness, even though human understanding might construe his unique position 
to be a lonely one. There can be no ‘Other’ for God and from his perspective, since “the Other 
[…] is also the locus of lack” (Lacan 524) – and God knows no lack. 
Similarly, when Belsey writes that “[o]nly the gaze of another subject can give back to 
God the imaginary plenitude of perfect presence, reasserting his unity as speaker and spoken, 
signifier and signified, the absolute ‘I am’” (Belsey 70), she disregards the fact that Milton’s 
God is peerless, beyond equal, and does not actually need any gratification or love or 
acknowledgement from his Creation, because he is his own creation (ex deo) and does not 
need those same things the way Man does, in order to survive. God does not “assume the 
place of meaning” (Belsey 70), when he is and embodies this place. In arguing that “the 
whole Creation becomes a mirror, reflecting back God’s total power and his infinite 
goodness” (Belsey 71), Belsey seems to suggest that God needs this reflection of himself in 
order to compensate for a lack. Because how can Milton’s God be “complete, without lack” 
(Belsey 68) and be subjected to an unresolved desire in the form a Lacanian lack, a desire for 
love? 
If God really were driven by lack, to have and need this splendour reflected back to 
him would amount to Satanic self-aggrandizement. God’s Creation, however, is “Sufficient to 
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have stood, though free to fall” (PL III, 99) or, more generally, free in assent as well in 
dissent. To praise God is not an obligation. God does not need to have his “infinite goodness” 
cast and mirrored back to him. If this were the case, to praise God would not be a free choice 
and, consequently, it would be meaningless. As Milton himself stipulates in his Christian 
Doctrine: if God is not loved freely “whatever worship or love we men offer to God is 
worthless and of no account” (Milton, Christian Doctrine 418). 
In fact, the obverse is true. It is God’s Creation that sees in itself the image and infinite 
goodness of God. Again, it is from Man’s perspective that the desire is projected and 
emanates. God never comes down except to raise up: again, it is God’s promise to support 
man – “Upheld by me” (PL III, 178) – and the Son who “rais’d” (VIII, 300) Adam and placed 
him in his Edenic context. An investigation into what happens on the Edenic level of Milton’s 
Creation in Paradise Lost will follow below, in chapter two. 
I have argued that the hierarchical structure and make-up of Creation illustrates most 
clearly the separation between God and the Word: the farther from God on the ladder of 
creation, the bigger the remove between signifier and signified. So that all the way at the 
bottom we find Satan and his guileful puns and wordplay. In the following chapter, I will 
extend this notion and add that, after the Fall, the Symbolic order becomes the status quo: 
with the Fall, the signifier truly makes its entrance into Paradise, with the result that both 
Adam and Eve’s language is drastically different in their post-lapsarian reality. Satan 
introduces a preoccupation with the signifier, an emphasis on the “outward lustre” (PL I, 97) 
of the sign with the Symbolic order he enforces as a direct consequence of the Fall of Man.  
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Chapter 2 
Stating the Symbolic: Adam and Eve and the Influence of Satan 
 
“from her Husbands hand her hand / Soft she withdrew”  
– Paradise Lost, IX 385-6 
 
In the previous chapter, we have encountered what I would like to refer to as a vertical 
separation: a separation along the axis of the celestial hierarchy that runs up and down, 
accordion-like, extending and contracting, growing ever more pronounced and protracted as 
the narrative progresses. As a result of the Fall of Man the budding potential – “Improv’d by 
tract of time” (PL X, 498) – of Paradise especially, and that of Creation in general, is lost or, 
at least, frozen and suspended in its place. On a local level, the level of Adam and Eve, this 
results in a separation that is not only vertical but horizontal as well. The event of the Fall and 
their separate actions surrounding it serve to sever the pair. This chapter focuses more 
immediately than the previous chapter on the Fall and its central role in the epic. It will focus 
especially on the role of Satan in luring first Eve and then, through her, Adam to the side of 
the signifier: “Fool’d and beguil’d, by him thou, I by thee” (X, 880). This will logically and 
naturally flow from an investigation into the relationship of the pair and their relation to the 
Word. 
 Satan, as the instigator of the Fall and its Symbolic repercussions, is mirrored in 
various ways in the characters of Adam and Eve as Milton represents them in their post-
lapsarian predicament. One of the main aims of this chapter is to explore how the Satanic 
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mode, the mode of the signifier, comes to determine Adam and Eve’s language, after the Fall 
of Man. The Fall not only vertically relocates Man away from the pre-lapsarian, extra-
Symbolic Word: it also separates Adam and Eve, as a pair. More specifically, the post-
lapsarian Symbolic state, by way of the Fall, reconfigures the relationship of the Edenic pair. 
Eve, for example, becomes a vehicle for Satanic thought after her bite of the fruit. Her first 
impulse after the act is to present herself to Adam in the form of a signifier, in a guise: “But to 
Adam in what sort / Shall I appeer” (PL IX, 816-7). In short, she becomes the embodiment of 
the signifier, and in this sense, she becomes like Satan. For the first time, in Paradise, an 
Edenic being does not share in the extra-Symbolic language of God but comes to partake of 
the signs of Satan: the Symbolic order is introduced and instituted with the Fall of Man.  
Two argumentative strains can be identified in this chapter. Firstly, drawing on the 
main argument presented in the previous chapter, namely that Satan, as ‘all-signifier’, is the 
embodiment of the Symbolic order, I will determine the extent of Satan’s Symbolic influence 
on Adam and Eve. Secondly, I will look at the relationship of the pair, and to what extent their 
new Symbolic state affects their relationship. By virtue of Adam’s and Eve’s separate lapses, 
in a temporal sense, the pair is pulled apart, but they are brought back together as they 
eventually conclude the epic “hand in hand” (PL XII, 648). The pair’s relationship, their 
symbolic and emblematic union notwithstanding, is reconfigured and, ultimately, their bond is 
different from its pre-lapsarian starting-point. The post-lapsarian relationship of the pair can 
be seen as a repetition of their pre-lapsarian bond but with a difference: it resurfaces in the 
same form, but it is different on a subsurface level. In other words, their relationship, in its 
post-lapsarian instance, is signifier-like, in the sense that here, too, a whole new dimension 
and multiplicity has been added to what was originally a singularly natural and 
straightforward bond. The investigation into the pair’s relationship is a prerequisite to arriving 
at an understanding of Satan’s influence on Adam and Eve. In this chapter, my analysis of the 
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influence and insistence of the Satanic signifier comes to intersect with an understanding of 
the pair’s relationship: Satan paves the way for a Symbolic language that, at the end of 
Milton’s epic, Adam and Eve enter into as well, and it alters their relationship. 
Before I address the repercussions of the pair’s propulsion into the Satanic Symbolic 
order in the moment of the Fall, I first have to address and discuss the paradoxical occurrence 
of language in Paradise Lost before the actual arrival of and move into the Symbolic order, 
the order of language, traditionally speaking. I argue that even though Adam and Eve do 
speak before the Fall – and can therefore logically be said to have language – they partake of 
the Word of God rather than of a post-lapsarian, Symbolic instance of it. I will refer to the 
occurrence of this pre-lapsarian language as ‘pre-Symbolic’ (or, ‘proto-Symbolic’), since it 
predates their move into the post-lapsarian Symbolic order: it is the original, the prototype, 
that the post-lapsarian Symbolic order flows from, eventually. 
The marker ‘pre-Symbolic’, rather than the more customary Lacanian ‘Imaginary’, is 
used here because by this point in the narrative Adam and Eve, as mentioned, already speak 
and partake of a language. More essentially, since they can already speak, they must have 
concluded their move through the Mirror Stage and its Imaginary order. The move into the 
post-lapsarian Symbolic order, then, is a move, not from the Imaginary absence of language 
into the order of the sign, but from a pre-Symbolic state, characterized by a language that 
partakes of the Word, to a language that is less perfect and less natural than its extra-
Symbolic, pre-lapsarian counterpart. The pre-Symbolic state captures the potential of a plane 
of being that can still go either way: it can concentrate on and trivialize by means of the 
signifier to become Symbolic in the Satanic sense, or it can evolve and expand to fold out into 
a more elaborate approximation of God’s extra-Symbolic order. Such is the potential of 
Paradise. 
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For example, God’s extra-Symbolic language is so direct and immediate that every 
word is taken in its most literal sense, as is only natural to the extra-Symbolic order. Adam, 
however, resides on a different plane still: he partakes of God’s language, but he is not equal 
to the Word in its fullest measure and sense. Adam’s language can therefore be usefully 
described as pre-Symbolic rather than extra-Symbolic. The difference between God and his 
extra-Symbolic language and Adam’s separation from it is evidenced by what amounts to 
Adam’s failure to fully anticipate the literal consequences of his requests of God in Book 
VIII: “[w]hen Adam asks for a partaker, he presumably does not anticipate that God will 
reach into his body and take a part, his “bleeding rib”. Similarly, when he describes a mate as 
“what methought I wanted still”, he probably does not grasp that when he has a mate, she will 
be what he still wants, that is, lacks and desires” (Grossman 435)5. There is no distance 
whatsoever between God’s Word and its meaning: the Word exists in a perfect one-to-one 
relationship of signifier and signified. The picture of Adam that Grossman presents, here, is 
that of a being who is on the same page with God but at a different line. It is a picture of the 
pre-Symbolic trying to make sense of the extra-Symbolic. The extra-Symbolic exists outside 
of the Symbolic order. The pre-Symbolic does too, but it does not encompass and transcend 
all three orders simultaneously the way the extra-Symbolic does. A schematic representation6:	
	
																																								 																				
5 The two quotations used by Grossman need revision and specification of reference. The first quote is slightly 
different in the text I have consistently made use of throughout: “what me thought I wanted still” (PL VIII, 355; 
emphasis added). The second quote, “bleeding rib”, is not, to my knowledge, a literal phrase of Milton’s in 
Paradise Lost. I think Grossman is referring to “a Rib, with cordial spirits warme” (VIII, 466). 
6 The two circles in the schema represent the two continua of the extra-Symbolic and the pre-Symbolic orders – 
the bigger and the smaller, respectively. The extra-Symbolic circle is all-encompassing and will always absorb 
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Now that I have established the existence of a gradient, different degrees, in the extra-
Symbolic order, before the Fall, I will be able to work towards an understanding of Adam and 
Eve and their respective relationships with the extra-Symbolic Word, qua the pre-Symbolic. 
This is where their natural difference is and becomes most evident: Adam, as the first-created, 
of the pair, is introduced to the Word before Eve and has a different relationship with it. Now 
follows an exposition of Adam’s and Eve’s respective relationships with the Word. This 
difference will set up the pair’s relationship for the fateful break that will be engendered by 
their move into the Symbolic order, by the hand of Satan. 
In order to bridge the gap between God and Man, Milton uses a ‘language of 
accommodation’ in order to represent God faithfully, from the human perspective. Milton 
firmly believed that “God, as he really is, is far beyond man’s imagination, let alone his 
understanding” (Milton, Christian Doctrine 398-9). It is necessary, therefore, to institute a 
mediator between the divine being and Man, even in the pre-Symbolic state that Adam and 
Eve enjoy before the Fall of Man. This happens either in the form of an angel – first Raphael 
and, at the end, Michael – or the Son, as the voice of God. Raphael, especially, refers to the 
need for an adapted version of events fit for human understanding, “by lik’ning spiritual to 
corporal forms” (PL V, 573). 
This notion can be extended to bear on the relationship of the Edenic pair. Because of 
the natural hierarchy of Paradise, Eve’s relationship to the Word is different from Adam’s: 
“Hee for God only, shee for God in him” (PL IV, 299). As a result, Adam acts as a mediator 
for Eve, translating the celestial message into Earthly terms. This will be the case especially 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																													
the smaller orb. The smaller, inner circle is analogous to the the pre-Symbolic order as it stands in relation to its 
encompassing, encircling counterpart: it can never completely fill and approach it, but it nonetheless resembles 
its archetype, the extra-Symbolic. It is only with the move into the Symbolic order that the signifier and the 
signified become separated and find a place along the fringe of the inner, pre-Symbolic circle, diametrically 
opposed to one another, on either end of the arrow. In the Symbolic order, meaning no longer resides in the 
continuum that the circle represents, but only on the fringe, in the form of a split of the two constituents of 
meaning in a fixed, diagonally opposed separation. It is in this capacity that the Symbolic order can be seen to 
resemble more closely the pre-Symbolic, since the one flows from the other from the other before it. 
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after the Fall, when Michael highlights Adam’s role as mediator and Adam is asked to relate 
to Eve the time-lapse he has just witnessed: “Let her with thee partake what thou hast heard” 
(XII, 598). The same subjection and subordination to the Word, in its most natural instance, is 
evident before the Fall. This sense is heightened by the scene in Book V in which Raphael is 
sent down to converse with and forewarn the pair. It is Adam with whom the angel ends up 
talking; Eve leaves to prepare a fit meal for their heavenly guest.  
Eve leaves to tend to their repast. Nature, in Paradise Lost, is suggestively connected 
with Eve (Flannagan 486n106). Eve, with a native and umbilical tie7 binding her to the 
Garden, exists in closer communion with Nature than Adam. Nature is referred to as a 
feminine entity, but, above all, she is linked to Eve because of certain corresponding epithets. 
In Book V, for example, Nature is described as being “Wantond as in her prime” (PL V, 294-
5): this is a very clear reference back to the previous book in which Eve’s “wanton ringlets” 
(IV, 306) are mentioned. Flannagan notes that in both cases the words are to be read as being 
completely devoid of post-lapsarian significance and as retaining connotations of “fecundity” 
and innocence rather than hinting at future-tense fallenness (Flannagan 484n90). I would like 
to add, however, that the correspondence between the two words establishes a link between 
Nature on the one hand and Eve on the other. Nature is her terrain, and so when Adam 
converses with Raphael, Eve hastens into Nature “on hospitable thoughts intent” (PL V, 332). 
Adam’s fit place, on the other hand, seems to be closer to the Word. Adam’s first 
encounter with the Word, the first instance of the Word in Paradise, occurs with the Father, by 
way of the Son. Adam is appellated and assigned a place: “thy Mansion wants thee, Adam, 
rise, / First Man, of Men innumerable ordain’d / First Father” (PL VIII, 296-8). There is a 
direct rapport between Adam and the Voice as “call’d by thee I come thy Guide / To the 
																																								 																				
7 Eve was taken from Adam’s cordial side after Adam had been placed in the Garden, and so Eve was born in the 
Garden of Eden. 
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Garden of bliss” (VIII, 298-9). The Voice responds to Adam’s first ontological queries: “how 
came I thus, how here?” (VIII, 277). Adam addresses his surroundings when he is still in 
ignorance with regards to his Maker and his own place in the scheme of things, but it is the 
ubiquitous Voice that responds and acknowledges him. In this pre-lapsarian, extra-Symbolic 
state, God is readily accessible through everything: “Ye Hills and Dales, ye Rivers, Woods, 
and Plaines, / And ye that live and move, fair Creatures” (VIII, 275-6). God is in all of the 
above, and when Adam addresses his surroundings it is the Voice of God that responds. 
When God creates Man in Paradise Lost, Adam (and later, Eve) is not immediately 
subject to the pre-Symbolic order of Creation. Leonard writes that “Adam imposes names as 
soon as he awakes from his Maker’s hands” (Leonard 23). This, however, leaves unaddressed 
Adam’s initial visuo-sensory bewilderment and wonder. Adam first enters consciousness with 
a growing awareness of his surroundings through the visual senses. In fact, his first conscious 
act is his turning “wondering Eyes” (PL VIII, 257) heavenward. Incidentally, Adam turns his 
eyes in the direction whence he derived his image. Or, more specifically, Adam directs his 
eyes towards his Maker, in whose image he is created. He then becomes aware of his physical 
being: “My self I then perus’d, and Limb by Limb / Survey’d” (VIII 267-8). He walks, he 
runs, he jumps, and the blissful innocence of Adam’s first unpremeditated steps are mirrored 
in the bliss of the surrounding paradise: “all things smil’d” (VIII, 265). A similar blissfulness 
is evoked in Book VII as Creation cannot wait to burst into being “with glad precipitance” 
(VII, 291). 
It is important to note Milton’s use of the verb ‘peruse’, which is suggestive of an 
inherent linguistic awareness or intuition on Adam’s part. His first conscious act can be said 
to be his ‘reading’ (OED, “peruse, v.”, II.4.a) the text his physical being presents to him. 
Adam commences to parse, “Limb by Limb” (PL VIII, 267), the language of his body. 
Indeed, this is a passive linguistic act and Adam does not yet speak and actively use any 
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language, but he is most certainly wired to respond to his surroundings in way that is 
underpinned by language. Adam’s budding linguistic potential is already contained within 
him and it evidently cannot wait to manifest itself openly – perhaps not unlike Creation in 
general, language will flow from Adam “with glad precipitance” (VII, 291). 
As, in fact, it does. After having become physically aware, and having entered 
consciousness, Adam commences to name the creatures and the objects of Paradise: “to speak 
I tri’d, and forthwith spake, / My Tongue obey’d and readily could name / What e’re I saw” 
(PL VIII, 271-3). Adam linguistically invents with no holds barred. He can name Creation, or, 
at least, his tongue intuits with what sounds to match his observations. He does so, however, 
by merely recognizing “the appropriateness of a certain name to a certain creature” (Leonard 
1). Adam is not completely free, but as Leonard argues, “Adam’s freedom, reason, and 
responsibility come together in his giving and understanding names” (9). In a Lacanian sense, 
then, Adam is propelled into an existing structure or model that is inherently linguistic and 
always-already present even before the individual consciousness enters into it. What is 
important and potentially paradoxical to point out is that Adam is propelled into this structure 
only to the extent that it is not ‘created’ by him: he merely linguistically anticipates and intuits 
the nomenclature of Paradise, but his language is creative, and he does in fact initiate it. 
At the same time, then, Adam can be said to share, to a certain extent, in God’s divine 
speech act: “how may I know him, how adore” (PL VIII, 280) Adam “call’d” (VIII, 283), and 
God responds: “call’d by thee I come thy Guide” (VIII, 298). Adam, too, has the capacity to 
effectuate changes or a response through the use of language. In this pre-lapsarian state, 
Adam is still close enough to God, so as to be naturally subjected to the deity without being 
subjected to an overruling structure: it is still very natural. It is in this instance, with Adam as 
a creative ‘author’, that it becomes most clear that Adam is part of the pre-lapsarian, pre-
	 Fousert 49 
 
Symbolic order. God, in fact, wants Adam to partake of the extra-Symbolic, linguistic 
plenitude: the birds and the beasts “Came summond over Eden to receive / Thir names of 
thee” (VI, 75-6; emphasis added); it is specifically “thou thir Natures know’st, & gav’st them 
Names” (VII, 493; emphasis added); “I bring them to receave / From thee thir Names” (VIII, 
343-4; emphasis added). 
There still remains the problem of Adam’s want for a “fit help” (PL VIII, 450), his 
existential loneliness despite his pre-Symbolic closeness to God. Adam wants to know where 
his first sights leave him in the scheme of things immediately following his creation. He 
inquires of his surroundings: “Tell, if ye saw, how came I thus, how here?” (VIII, 277). His 
first instinct is to communicate, to involve his surroundings, whether animate or inanimate, in 
his inquiry. The moment Adam distinguishes the external world, he wants to communicate 
with it. He then finds, however, that he cannot:  
I nam’d them, as they pass’d, and understood  
Thir Nature, with such knowledge God endu’d  
My sudden apprehension: but in these  
I found not what me thought I wanted still (VIII, 352-5) 
Adam, here, gives voice to the inevitable lack at the heart of the (pre-)Symbolic order. This 
might be read as a foreshadowing of what the post-lapsarian, Symbolic order has in store for 
Adam and Eve. Adam is a subject and this makes him existentially lonely. As yet still 
relatively close to God, through the Son, Adam is able to approximate communion with his 
maker, even though the words have to be adapted for Adam’s human understanding. Even in 
the pre-lapsarian Eden, Adam will always have a fit place, at a natural remove from God. 
However, it is not only in relation to God that Adam experiences at least a nominal distance. 
Adam, still in his pre-lapsarian state, is at the same time so close to God and the extra-
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Symbolic that he is also divorced from the rest of Creation by virtue of this bond. Adam, in 
his own way, is exalted too. In Paradise, Adam exists in approximation of both God and of 
Creation: being close to both, he is equal to neither. This explains Adam’s sense of loneliness 
before the creation of Eve. At least with Eve there, more his equal than other being in 
Creation, Adam will have someone to share his pre-lapsarian, pre-Symbolic state with, on the 
most natural of levels. 
With regards to the story of Eve’s coming into consciousness, Smyth argues that “Eve 
is, in fact, ‘self-begot’” (Smyth 138), putting her on a creative par with Satan, who also 
linguistically constructs a narrative in which he instigates his own creation: “We know no 
time when we were not as now; / Know none before us, self-begot, self-rais’d” (PL V, 859-
60). Eve was created narratively, “in no one’s image but her own” (Smyth 138), in her own 
words. Smyth writes that “[d]espite the inevitable fact of Eve having fallen first, Milton still 
portrays Eve to be master of language and author of her own narrative” (Smyth 151). The 
main argument, here, rests on the fact that Eve is the first of the pair in Milton’s epic to 
narrate and recount their own creation. Smyth’s assumption with regards to Eve’s originality 
in Book V, in turn and by implication, recasts Adam’s narration in Book VIII as 
‘unimaginative’ and ‘unoriginal’ (Smyth 147). According to Smyth, then, Adam is “subject 
to, rather than master of, language” (Smyth 145). As such, Smyth aligns Eve, if we transpose 
and extend her reading into the present project, with Satan as the embodiment of the Symbolic 
order, the order of language. Before the Fall, however, we cannot assume Eve’s language to 
be Satanic: it merely differs from Adam’s. Smyth places the pair’s respective moves into the 
Symbolic order, into language, squarely in the pre-lapsarian plenitude of the pre-Symbolic 
state they both, as I have argued, share in up until the fateful moment of the Fall. There cannot 
rightly be a Satanic Symbolic language before the event of the Fall, when language, both 
Adam’s and Eve’s, is as yet pre-Symbolic. 
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To incorporate Smyth’s reading into my understanding of the celestial hierarchy as it 
pertains to the separation of the Word, more emphasis has to be placed on the way in which 
Eve has ‘mastery’ over language, as a teller of tales, as a poetess, in contrast to Adam. Adam, 
as I have argued, authors and intuits language – again, “to speak I tri’d, and forthwith spake, / 
My Tongue obey’d and readily could name / What e’re I saw” (PL VIII, 271-3). In the case of 
Eve, on the other hand, this is not so. By the time Eve is created, language has already been 
anticipated by Adam. Instead, Eve takes this language and commences to arrange it so as to 
be able to construct a narrative with it. Adam’s language is creative in the sense that he 
initiates it. Eve’s language is creative in the way she uses it and rearranges its terms.  
For example, in Book IV, Eve delivers an impromptu composition in the form of a 
poem: “With thee conversing I forget all time / … / Or glittering Starr-light without thee is 
sweet” (PL IV, 639-56). Leonard lists some of the characteristics of “Eve’s love-lyric” 
(Leonard 257). Most notably, the poem can be subdivided into two parts, and “the sequence 
of beauties is the same in both parts” (Leonard 257). The poem is structured in such a way 
that Hillier comments on its two parts as reflecting one another: it is a “mirror poem” (Hillier 
2). The fact that such a crafted lyric is unpremeditatedly composed by Eve emphasises her 
affinity with language and her ability to rearrange its terms. In fact, Eve’s poem revolves and 
is arranged around Adam: “Eve’s speech moves around Adam in a timeless cycle” (Leonard 
256). The poem is eclipsed by descriptions devoted to the “with thee” (PL IV, 639) in the 
opening line and the “without thee” (IV, 656) at the close of the poem. Adam is captured in 
Eve’s language here, in the poem, the same way he will eventually be captivated by her 
language, and sin with her. 
Both Adam and Eve enter existence accompanied by a natural state of wonder that 
reflects the way each stands in relation to the Word. The reader is first introduced to Eve’s 
musings, in Book IV: “much wondring where / And what I was, whence thither brought, and 
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how” (PL IV, 451-2). Adam’s similar query follows in Book VIII, as he wonders “how came I 
thus, how here?” (VIII, 277). Where Adam looks for answers in language, they are afforded 
him by the Voice, first in a dream and then “all real, as the dream / Had lively shadowd” 
(VIII, 310-11). Eve, on the other hand, finds her answers in the “answering looks” (IV, 464; 
emphasis added) that the “liquid Plain” (IV, 455) provides her with. The Voice warns her and 
guides her to Adam: “what could I doe, / But follow strait, invisibly thus led?” (IV, 475-6). 
Eve is led to Adam, her other image, but Eve implies that it was not a matter of choice. As 
soon as she realizes that the reality of Adam is not the same as the prospective image – 
literally “like thy self” (IV, 474) – that she left behind in the water’s reflective surface, she 
returns to it. Evidently, when she is told that “to him [thou] shalt beare / Multitudes like thy 
self, and thence be call’d / Mother of human Race” (IV, 473-5), Eve envisions that she will 
bear multitudes like herself, as seen in the watery mirror, and not like Adam, “Whose image 
thou art” (IV, 472). 
 Eve, like Adam, as discussed above, misinterprets the Word. Adam is surprised by 
what Fish calls “the congruency between the word and the thing” (Fish 118) of pre-lapsarian 
language, the linguistic plenitude that I refer to as the extra-Symbolic Word. Adam, endowed 
with the pre-Symbolic sense in approximation of the Word, fails to fully anticipate the 
consequences of his requests of God, as narrated in Book VIII. Eve, on the other hand, takes 
this congruency, the plenitude of the Word, for granted and, as a result, she takes the Word 
too literally. Between the two of them, there exist a perfect balance and interpretive model for 
engaging with the Word. Taken separately, however, Adam and Eve each engage with and 
interpret the Word inadequately, but they complement each other in this way, before the Fall. 
This brings the investigation to the event of the Fall itself. Even before the Fall, Adam 
and Eve exist in a fixed relation to one another, on the basis of the hierarchy of Creation. 
Consequently, their pre-lapsarian bond is natural, whereas the lot that is created in the 
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moment of the Fall is not. It is only after the Fall that Adam and Eve are truly linked in their 
predicament, but this renewed bond does not bring them closer: they are united in their fate 
alone. As Adam rightly foreshadows in Book IX: “I with thee have fixt my Lot” (PL IX, 952). 
It is in the recurring image of Adam and Eve’s ‘handedness’ (Flannagan 452n96)8 that their 
relationship and its trajectory are mirrored. It describes a move from “hand in hand alone” 
(IV, 689) where Adam and Eve make one of their earliest appearances, to the closing lines 
where “They hand in hand … / … took thir solitarie way” (PL XII, 648-9). The pair’s 
handedness, though a constant, changes in meaning over the course of the epic. It shifts from 
an image where they are manually so connected as to literally have become one, ‘solus’, to 
the moment where Eve withdraws “from her Husbands hand her hand” (IX, 385) moments 
before the Fall, to the closing lines where the pair is seen hand in hand again. Rather than 
bringing Adam and Eve together, the Fall separates them, but only to bring them in relation to 
one another a fixed place, the order of the signifier, the Symbolic. In this new state, they make 
their way together, hand in hand, but they are not as intrinsically and intricately connected as 
before the event: they are now “solitarie” (XII, 649), fatefully separated from the pre-
lapsarian Word and from God. They might go in the same general direction and share the 
way, but they move on parallel planes, equidistant from one another: they share in the same 
Symbolic order where, because of the limiting nature of language, they can never be as truly 
‘one’ as before the Fall. There is some solace in the thought that, at least, they share their 
predicament and are subjected to the same order of being. 
Directly following the Fall, the wiring of the natural relationship of Adam and Eve as 
we know it from before the event is altered. Before the mortal sin has been completed by 
Adam’s taste of the Fruit (PL IX, 997-1004), Eve is positioned and exalted over Adam, or at 
																																								 																				
8 Flannagan has noted almost all occurrences of the image of the pair with hands intertwined, but he has 
overlooked one instance. For meticulousness and the complete list: 4.321, 4.488-9, 4.689, 4.739; 9.244, 9.385, 
9.1037; 12.648. 
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least, so she thinks. She actually debates whether she should even share her new-found 
knowledge and plane of being with Adam:  
              But to Adam in what sort 
Shall I appeer? shall I to him make known 
As yet my change, and give him to partake 
Full happiness with mee, or rather not, 
But keep the odds of Knowledge in my power 
Without Copartner? (PL IX, 816-21) 
Eve debates whether to keep her loss of ignorance concealed from Adam. She would rather 
conceal and shroud it than have Adam become her peer again. Eve’s behaviour is a mirroring 
of Satan’s earlier theatricality, as he “New part puts on” (IX, 667) to act out his guile. 
Flannagan notes that the passage is replete with theatrical references so as to emphasize 
Satan’s role as a deceiver who uses disguise the same way an actor would put on a part to 
sustain a fiction (Flannagan 606n202). Similarly, Eve becomes the actress after the Fall, as 
she wonder what fiction to present to Adam: “in what sort / Shall I appeer?” (PL IX, 816-7). 
After she has eaten of the Fruit, Eve enters Satan’s Symbolic order and starts to adopt the 
guise and guile the signifier has to offer. 
 Eve does eventually decide to reveal herself to Adam, but merely because the thought 
of “Adam wedded to another Eve” (PL IX, 828) is more than she can bear. Eve does not want 
the signifier ‘Eve’ to slide and cover anyone other than her, the original ‘Eve’, her own 
personal place with which she has come to identify. The appellation in Book IV, then, has 
made a mark after all: “and thence be called / Mother of human Race” (IV, 474-5), but it is 
only after she succumbs to her desire and tastes of the Fruit that she finds in Adam her 
‘Other’, since it is after the Fall that Adam’s authority (and non du père) over Eve is called 
into being: again “to thy Husbands will / Thine shall submit, hee over thee shall rule” (X, 195-
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6). The moment Eve takes the bite from the Fruit, she becomes invested in the signifier of her 
name, her title, her place in the structure of Eden.  
 After he has heard of Eve’s trespass, Adam’s lack of authority over her is mirrored in 
his body language: “From his slack hand the Garland wreath’d for Eve / Down drop’d” (PL 
IX, 892-3; emphasis added). Adam’s body language hints at the submissiveness he starts to 
affect in the face of Eve. Adam’s ‘Other’, formerly located in the voice of God, his 
acceptance of the non du père, is re-located so as to rest, right before the moment of the Fall 
and, thus, accommodating the event, on Eve: “not deceav’d, / But fondly overcome with 
Femal charm” (IX, 998-9). Beauty, here, is not “excelld by manly grace” (IV, 490). Rather, it 
is the other way around, as Eve exercises authority over Adam, in the sense that Adam cannot 
but fall for and with Eve. Adam as Eve’s “Author and Disposer” (IV, 635), does not want to 
lose that part of him, since “to loose thee were to loose my self” (IX, 959). Potentially 
paradoxical, the non du père in this case lies, from Adam’s perspective, briefly with Eve as 
the figure he inscribes with ‘authority’. It is important to note that the figure of authority, in 
this case, is not male and therefore not a father figure, in the strictest sense: it does not have to 
be, since it is more about the embodiment of this figure and what it represents than the gender 
that is customarily linked to it. 
It is no coincidence that in the newly post-lapsarian world Adam with “alterd stile, / 
Speech intermitted thus to Eve renewd” (PL IX, 1132-3). Adam’s language is altered in style: 
the style of the pre-lapsarian, pre-Symbolic Word that Adam partook of before the event is 
reconfigured, ‘renewed’. Leonard remarks that, when Adam and Eve fall for this new mode of 
speaking, “their words are not new words, but they are familiar words used in a new way” 
(Leonard 177). It is in this sense that their, and in this case Adam’s, speech is renewed: the 
words are given a new dimension, a reimagined import, and multiplicity of meaning is born.   
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In Book IX, when Adam and Eve experience their virgin connubial fight, Adam calls 
Eve “thou Serpent, that name best / Befits thee” (PL X, 867-8). He, first of all, assigns a 
signifier to the person of Eve that does not do justice to the complex character Milton has 
shown the reader so far: Adam’s designation can only be said to have more direct bearing on 
the scene near the Tree, which he was not even physically there to witness. Secondly, Eve 
does not actually beguile Adam or trick him into trespassing the way she herself was by the 
actual serpent, Satan, and in that sense, too, he cannot justly make the comparison. Thirdly, in 
comparing Eve to the serpent he ascribes signifier-like qualities to Eve: “nothing wants, but 
that thy shape, / Like his, and colour Serpentine may shew / Thy inward fraud” (X, 869-71). 
Adam is worried about a notion that I will return to near the end of the chapter, below, namely 
the idea that the mode of the signifier can and will be used for ends that are pagan and non-
divine: “least that too heav’nly form, pretended / To hellish falshood” (X, 872-3). The 
outward sign may be misleading. 
 It is interesting that the Tree that yields the Symbolic order in the form of the Apple, is 
mirrored in a very specific tree, “The Figtree” (PL IX, 1101), which provides shade and 
shelter for Adam and Eve. The leaves function as a screen to hide behind not unlike the 
signifier in the post-lapsarian Symbolic order. The image of the two trees combined serve to 
illustrate the way in which the signifier functions in the post-lapsarian, Symbolic order, 
namely to obscure and to render opaque. 
This is where the idea of Truth as veiled or hidden comes into play. In the 
Areopagitica, Milton talks of the sequestering of Truth as a result of the Fall of Man. This of 
course has everything to do, and is completely in line, with the notion of a vertical move: the 
Son descending and, later on, rising up again with the Word:  
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Truth indeed came once into the world with her divine Master and was a perfect shape 
most glorious to look on. But when he ascended and his apostles after him were laid 
asleep, then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that story goes of the 
Egyptian Typhon with his conspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris, took the 
virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the 
four winds. (Milton, Areopagitica 203) 
A veiled and scattered meaning is exactly what Satan evokes and brings into Paradise with his 
Symbolic order. Satan’s language is always ambiguous and fraught with plurality of meaning. 
In other words, the signified behind Satan’s signifier is always veiled and covered by the 
latter, to the obstruction and detriment of the clarity of the former, the meaning. Eve wants to 
disguise herself from Adam by putting on different parts and “appeer” (PL IX, 817) to him in 
a certain premeditated, unnatural way. The pair also becomes aware of their bodily presence 
and this makes them unprecedentedly ashamed of their bodies: it is as if “each the other 
viewing” (IX, 1052), they perceive each other for the first time and this, too, causes them to 
hide and put up a façade. The pair is now “cover’d” (IX, 1058) but they are “Uncover’d 
more” (IX, 1059), meaning that whatever they veil themselves with is not sufficient to cover 
all it is supposed to envelop. In other words, similar to the way the signifier insufficiently tries 
to comprise a totality of meaning in the Symbolic order, Adam and Eve are unable to 
completely cover themselves in their post-lapsarian state. 
The pair’s impulse to hide themselves is not limited to the two of them. In their post-
lapsarian state Adam and Eve have become apprehensive of the voice of God, of the Word: “I 
heard thee in the Garden, and of thy voice / Afraid, being naked, hid my self” (PL X, 116-7). 
Adam and Eve, not unlike Satan, feel the need to hide themselves from the face and the Word 
of God. In the final book, it becomes clear that “the voice of God / To mortal eare is dreadful” 
(XII, 235-6). This constitutes the pair’s most tangible separation from the pre-Symbolic state: 
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the extra-Symbolic Word of God, previously within their reach in their pre-Symbolic state, 
has now become dreadful to their ears, as it now fills them with fear rather than bliss. Adam 
and Eve will have to start to make do with an indirect line of communication: prayer.  
Another veritable shift in meaning occurs in the wake of the Fall: “O voice once heard 
/ Delightfully, Encrease and multiply, / Now death to heare” (PL X, 729-31). This reference 
to the first book of Genesis, has a completely different import before the pair’s fate is sealed 
as a result of the Fall. In a pre-lapsarian sense, Adam and Eve’s urge and calling to “Be 
fruitful, and multiply” (KJV, Gen. 1.28) is their way to contribute to the extra-Symbolic 
plenitude of Paradise. After the Fall, however, after judgement has been passed, to ‘increase 
and multiply’ now equals an ordeal that mankind has to endure over and over again. For her, 
the female line, the fruitfulness of Eve is problematized in the form of labour-pains at 
childbirth. For him, for the male progeny, it is the earthliness of Adam, his pedogenesis, that 
is inverted and results in the sentence of death for mankind, a return to the soil from which 
Adam was raised: “For dust thou art, and shalt to dust returne” (PL X, 208). 
After being told that they are to lose their place in Eden, Adam laments the loss of the 
Garden as follows: “This most afflicts me, that departing hence, / As from his face I shall be 
hid, deprivd / His blessed count’nance; here I could frequent” (PL XI, 315-7). These lines 
illustrate how the Fall causes the pair to attach themselves overmuch to the visible, the 
outside, the signifier. Adam and Eve are now so far removed from God, from their earlier pre-
lapsarian seat, that they have come to view the place itself as their access to God. To Adam, 
the Garden has become a signifier for God’s love for man: “under this Tree / Stood visible, 
among these Pines his voice / I heard” (XI, 320-1). Adam has become sentimental about the 
place itself, the signifier, and he does not realize that he has access to the God on a wholly 
different level. After the Fall, Milton’s God is located somewhere else: he resides in “A 
paradise within … , happier farr” (XII, 587). It is evident that, as Fish writes, “[t]he loss of the 
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perfect language is more than anything else the sign of the Fall, since in Eden speech is the 
outward manifestation of the inner Paradise” (Fish 118). After the Fall, Eden itself comes to 
manifest, to Adam especially, an outward Paradise: it is the place in its outward shape and 
form that he regrets losing, since the loss of the place has come to be equated with the loss of 
that with which Adam associates it, God.  
Another result of the Fall that reconfigures the original, natural station of Adam and 
Eve is that she will be subject to the patriarchal order. Milton himself is of the opinion that the 
Fall of Man caused a difference and distinction to arise in the sexes in terms of authority and 
power: “[t]he husband’s authority became still greater after the fall” (Christian Doctrine 464-
5). In Paradise Lost this view is propagated as well, when in Book XI, Michael tells Eve that 
“to thy Husbands will / Thine shall submit, hee over thee shall rule” (PL X, 195-6). The Fall 
reconfigures the pair’s relationship in the sense that the event fixes their relationship on the 
merit of power, Adam’s will, rather than on that of “[Adam’s] reason and wisdom” 
(Dzelzainis 561). As Grossman writes, in her pre-lapsarian instance Eve, in comparison to 
Adam’s, is “framed precisely in the hole revealed by Adam’s inspection heavenward” 
(Grossman 433). Adam apprehends heaven directly and immediately, whereas Eve sees it as a 
reflection in the surface of the lake “that to me seemd another Skie” (PL IV, 459). This echoes 
Eve’s later “God is thy Law, thou mine” (IV, 637), which, in turn, is a paraphrasis of “Hee for 
God only, shee for God in him” (IV, 299). This is a key notion to the natural hierarchy of 
God’s Creation. Again, it is a difficult notion to square with the idea that all of Creation exists 
in perfect equality. However, in the pre-lapsarian absence of the Symbolic, this difference 
does not yet have any definite, negative connotations that would link it to inequality in a 
political or social sense. Before the Fall, inequality is merely a natural distinction. It is only 
after the Fall that their relationship is reconfigured and it starts to hinge on power and 
authority rather than on natural superiority. 
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This ties in beautifully with Milton’s more political convictions. In terms of Milton’s 
political agenda in the writing of Paradise Lost, the notion that God is the most natural and 
only authority constitutes a caustic attack in the face of monarchic power and human-imposed 
authority. A political reading of Satan as Symbolic and, in this instance, the post-lapsarian as 
a state that is Symbolic by nature, results in a critique on a reality in which names, titles, and 
signs are exalted over the underlying meaning: “I glorie in the name, / Antagonist of Heav’ns 
Almightie King” (X, 386-7). The name, the signifier, has become a source of exultation. After 
the Fall, the word is just a show and, as a signifier, naturally lends itself to exploitation the 
moment too much is being invested in it, as is the case in the post-lapsarian reality Milton is 
witness to. 
Couched as a comment on the lacking and compromised communicative accuracy of 
language, the last Edenic visitation, Michael’s advice to Adam, is primarily visual and not 
verbal. Michael shows and explains to Adam that in the post-lapsarian state, the Symbolic 
word threatens to become blasphemous, potentially idolatrous: 
Then they shall seek to avail themselves of names,  
Places and titles, and with these to joine 
Secular power, though feigning still to act 
By spiritual, to themselves appropriating 
The Spirit of God, promisd alike and giv’n 
To all Beleevers; and form that pretense, 
Spiritual Lawes by carnal power shall force 
On every conscience … (PL XII, 515-22) 
Milton, here, gives voice to the fear that the Word is prone to becoming a commodity in the 
post-lapsarian reality, and that the two, the Word (extra-Symbolic) and the word (Symbolic), 
will be confused. The Word qua the word is portrayed as a source of authority that can be 
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used, in the wrong hands, not only for spiritual purposes but also for privative, non-divine 
ends: “till the temptation of such a power left absolute in their hands, perverted them at length 
to injustice and partiality” (Milton, The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates 277). The glimpse 
of the Symbolic order that Michael has Adam witness captures what Satan has been guilty of 
all along: embedded in these lines is the sense that the divine and scriptural Word can and will 
be used and appropriated by non-divine authority and power, in effect creating those two 
latter notions in the process. As Leonard writes: “[n]ames and high titles which are not 
vouchsafed by God or are acquired in His despite can only belie, not befit, one’s true nature” 
(Leonard 51). 
I have argued that, after the Fall, Satan, and his (dis-)use of language, becomes the 
embodiment of the Symbolic order, where signifier and signified are truly separated and 
meaning is no longer necessarily with the unity of signifier and signified, as with Milton’s 
extra-Symbolic God, but with the signifier, so that meaning, too, can be seen to slide along 
the axis of the signifier. In Satan’s Symbolic order, language as a whole has become, “meerly 
titular” (PL V, 774). After the Fall of Man, Adam and Eve partake in this new reality through 
their use of language, and this alters their relationship. 
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Conclusion 
Over the course of this thesis, I have offered the following two core arguments: (1) there 
exists, in Paradise Lost, a vertical move away from the Word of God towards the word of 
Satan, with the former as the essence of an extra-Symbolic state where signifier and signified 
cement and unite, and the latter as the embodiment of the signifier only, a Symbolic order in 
detachment of the signified. And (2) this vertical move is effectuated by a horizontal 
separation on the Edenic level of Adam and Eve: it is the Fall of Man that seals the separation 
of signifier and signified, so that the post-lapsarian reality of Adam and Eve is firmly 
Symbolic, in the sense that, from that moment onwards, meaning is ascribed to and inscribed 
in “Names, / places and titles” (PL XII, 515-6). In short, meaning comes to reside with 
language in the Lacanian Symbolic sense, post-laspe, with the sign that is the signifier. 
 To combine these two arguments, some theoretical gymnastics were in order. The fact 
remains that both Adam and Eve speak and have language before the Fall and their move, in 
my reading, into the Symbolic order introduced by the beguiling signifier, Satan. One might 
venture to ask how come Adam and Eve are able to speak in absence, or abeyance, of (a move 
into) the Symbolic order? The answer is found in the vertical separation of chapter one and 
the positioning of God in an order so quintessentially linguistic (by virtue of the Word) it is 
comparable to the Lacanian order of the Real – referred to and invoked here as the ‘extra-
Symbolic’. Before the Fall, Adam and Eve still partake of this order in a ‘pre-Symbolic’ 
sense: the potential of Paradise allows the pair a position that can still tilt (rise or fall) either 
way. The notion of a pre-Symbolic state – a Worded, pre-lapsarian Paradise – paves the way 
for a reading of the Mirror Stage as early as Adam’s and Eve’s respective creations without 
necessitating a pre-lapsarian (and, therefore, premature) move into the Symbolic order, which 
is, of course, impossible if I am to temporally position this move squarely in the moment of 
the Fall, by the hand of Satan. As a result of their passage through the Mirror Stage, Adam 
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and Eve first enter into an approximation of the extra-Symbolic order of God, their pre-
Symbolic state. It is only in the moment of the Fall of Man, by the guile of Satan, that the pair 
is ultimately ushered into the Symbolic order.  
My reading of Paradise Lost hinges on an appropriation of set Lacanian notions such 
as the order of the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic, as well as the mechanics of the 
Mirror Stage. In the section on methodology, I have outlined how Lacanian thought 
developed and came into being. I have traced Lacan’s thought along certain theories of 
Sigmund Freud and Ferdinand de Saussure, and pointed to the ways in which the two 
predecessors and their respective theoretical legacies have contributed to Lacan’s body of 
work. Lacan married two schools, as he brought to the field of psychology (Freud) an 
understanding of the structural and structured nature of language (Saussure). Lacan 
epitomizes his own work through the rhetorical question “how could a contemporary 
psychoanalyst not sense, in coming upon speech, that he had reached this domain, when it is 
from speech that analytic experience receives its instrument, its frame, its material, and even 
the background noise of its uncertainties” (Lacan 413).  
In chapter one, “Satan and the Separation of the Sign”, I have set out to expose a 
vertical distinction or separation extant within the make-up of Creation. God exists at the 
indivisible head, with the Word, in a perfect continuum of signifier and signified. Satan exists 
in stark contrast to this extra-Symbolic order of God, in an order that is most appropriately 
Symbolic. Satan is the embodiment of the signifier, in separation of the signified, so that 
meaning in his Symbolic state is a fluid concept, ever shifting and hard to pin down: this is 
illustrated most memorably by his “Evil be thou my Good” (PL IV, 110). In addition to the 
meaninglessness of the signifier in separation of the signified, the signifier is also used to 
disguise and beguile. 
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It is, most crucially, this aspect of the signifier, with Satan as its embodiment, that I 
have traced into the following chapter, “Stating the Symbolic: Adam and Eve and the 
Influence of Satan”. I have elaborated on the notion of a vertical distinction in Creation to 
include, in this chapter, a horizontal separation. This horizontal separation on the level of 
Adam and Eve is effectuated by the fateful institution of the Symbolic order. Adam and Eve 
are driven apart because of the guile of the signifier: by the hand of Satan, Eve veils herself, 
signifier-like, to the extent that she debates “in what sort” (PL IX, 816) to appear to Adam. 
Ultimately, Eve appears to Adam as Eve and not as a generic woman, a second, next 
signification of ‘Eve’. Adam, too, starts to set more and more store by the “outward lustre” (I, 
97) of his surroundings, be it Eve or the Garden of Eden, the place where he was closest to his 
Maker. In the end, they fix their lots (IX, 952) in their respective signifiers, so that Adam 
becomes not just any man but Adam, alongside his Eve. The pair is ultimately brought back 
together by their joint subjection to the Symbolic order, as, with the Fall, the mode of the 
signifier has become the more dominant strain. 
As another integral part to chapter two, I have looked at the inherent difference 
between Adam and Eve and how this natural inequality comes to effect their eventual fall. 
Since Adam and Eve are naturally different before the Fall – “Hee for God only, shee for God 
in him” (PL IV, 299) – each has their own relationship with the Word in their pre-lapsarian, 
pre-Symbolic state. Even though the Fall appears to bring them back together, Adam and 
Eve’s relationship is changed and reconfigured to unite them at a fixed distance from one 
another as they make “thir solitarie way” (XII, 649) out of Milton’s epic: disbanded from God 
and the place they have come to associate with his presence, and separated, too, from each 
other by dint of the institution of the Symbolic order of Satan. 
Rereading Milton’s Paradise Lost by way of a Lacanian approach involved a 
reinterpretation of set theoretical notions to accommodate Milton. Enlightened by mutual 
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application, both Milton’s text and the Lacanian framework were reimagined. When all is said 
and done, the Lacanian approach that I have adopted here does bear fruit, in a general, extra-
Symbolic sense: it does not try to exclude any other possible reading, or posit the current 
attempt as a final or definitive take on the text. All it hopes to do is establish a dialogue that 
will hopefully open up John Milton’s Paradise Lost and yield even more9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
9 “delicious fruit / So various, not to taste that onely Tree / Of knowledge” (PL IV, 422-4). 
	 Fousert 66 
 
Bibliography 
“Author, n.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, November 2016. Web. 21 November  
2016. <http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/Entry/13329>. 
Barry, Peter. Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory.  
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009. Print. 
Belsey, Catherine. John Milton: Language, Gender, Power. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.  
Print. 
Curran, Stuart. “God.” The Oxford Handbook of Milton, edited by Nicholas McDowell and  
Nigel Smith, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 525-33. Print. 
Danielson, Dennis. “The Fall and Milton’s Theodicy.” The Cambridge Companion to Milton,  
edited by Dennis Danielson, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 144-59. Print.  
Dzelzainis, Martin. “The Politics of Paradise Lost.” The Oxford Handbook of Milton, edited 
by Nicholas McDowell and Nigel Smith, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 547-68. 
Print. 
Fish, Stanley Eugene. Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost. London: Macmillan,  
1967. Print. 
Flannagan, Roy, editor. The Riverside Milton. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998. Print. 
Freud, Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund  
Freud. Translated by James Strachey, and Anna Freud, vol. 19, Vintage, 2001. Print. 
	 Fousert 67 
 
Grossman, Marshall. “The Rhetoric of Feminine Priority and the Ethics of Form in Paradise  
Lost.” English Literary Renaissance 33.3 (2003): 424-43. Web. 
Hillier, R. M. “‘A Happy Rural Seat of Various View’: Eve’s Mirror Poem and 
Her Lapse in Paradise Lost.” Milton Quarterly 48.1 (2014): 1-14. Web. 19 Dec. 2016. 
<http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/mlaib/docview/1551919735/
AA82C785AF4546D4PQ/1?accountid=12045>. 
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Translated by Bruce Fink, W. W. Norton and Company, 2006. Print.   
Leitch, Vincent B., editor. The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism. New York:   
W. W. Norton & Company, 2010. Print. 
Leonard, John. Naming in Paradise: Milton and the Language of Adam and Eve. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990. Print. 
Milton, John. “Paradise Lost.” The Riverside Milton, edited by Roy Flannagan, Houghton  
Mifflin, 1998, pp. 349-710. Print. 
---. “Christian Doctrine.” The Essential Prose of John Milton, edited by William Kerrigan,  
John Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon, Modern Library, 2013, pp. 392-532. Print. 
 ---. “Areopagitica.” The Essential Prose of John Milton, edited by William Kerrigan,  
John Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon, Modern Library, 2013, pp. 175-214. Print. 
---. “The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates.” The Essential Prose of John Milton, edited by  
William Kerrigan, John Rumrich, and Stephen M. Fallon, Modern Library, 2013, pp.  
	 Fousert 68 
 
175-214. Print. 
 “Peruse, v.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2016. Web. 17 December  
2016. 
<http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/Entry/141653?rskey=QnWmZ
2&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid>. 
Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated by A.D. Lindsay, J.M. Dent & Sons, 1948. Print. 
“Rear, v.1.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, November 2016. Web. 21 November  
2016. 
<http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/view/Entry/159023?rskey=odf29c&
result=5&isAdvanced=false#eid>. 
Russell, Bertrand. History of Western Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2004. Print. 
Saussure, Ferdinand de. “Course in General Linguistics.” The Norton Anthology of Theory  
and Criticism, edited by Vincent B. Leitch, W. W. Norton & Company, 2010, pp. 850-
866. Print. 
Smyth, M. J. “Narrating Originality in Paradise Lost.” SEL Studies in English Literature  
1500-1900 53.1 (2013): 137-155. Project MUSE. Web. 30 Aug. 2016.  
<https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/article/503757/pdf>. 
Tallis, Raymond. Not Saussure: A Critique of Post-Saussurean Literary Criticism.  
Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988. Print. 
